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Lewis and Tockman: Lewis: Status of the Missouri Law in the Troubled Area of Child Custody

THE STATUS OF THE MISSOURI LAW IN
THE TROUBLED AREA OF CHILD CUSTODY
JOSEPH W. LEwis* AND GERALD TocMAN**

The basic principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in judicial determinations of the right to custody has been so
universally proclaimed by all courts of Missouri and by the other courts
of the land, both federal and state, that the doctrine has indeed become
a judicial truism with which no courts take issue. The layman and, indeed,
the lawyer unfamiliar with child custody problems might be refreshed to
know that here at least is one area of the law where a simple, noble, human
precept will guide the courts in resolving the problems presented to them.
It is thus somewhat disconcerting to realize that even this great principle
of law is so buffeted by exceptions, exceptions to exceptions, statutory and
judicial procedural restrictions, jurisdictional limitations and uncertainties
and other overriding legal principles, that the great axiom so happily and
so consistently enunciated appears in many instances to be all but lost in
the confusion.
This article comprises primarily a review of the Missouri decisions
involving civil transfers of custody of children by courts pursuant to existing statutory authority. Specifically, the article will discuss cases arising: (1)
under the new Missouri Juvenile Code;' (2) under that portion of the
Missouri divorce law relating to transfer of custody of minor children; 2 and
(3) under the Missouri Habeas Corpus Statutes. 3
Custody problems in connection with adoption proceedings which are,
of course, under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,4 are discussed comprehensively in another part of this symposium 5 and will be touched upon
only incidentally in this article.
*Attorney, St. Louis, Mo.; B.A. Princeton University, 1934; L.L.B., Harvard
University, 1937; member, Family Law Committee of the Missouri Bar; former
Chairman, Juvenile Courts, Law and Procedure Committee of the St. Louis Bar;
partner, Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen and Chubb, St. Louis, Mo.
**Attorney, St. Louis, Mo.; B.A., Washington University, 1958; LL.B., Washington University, 1960; associate, Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allen and Chubb, St.
Louis, Mo.
1. §§ 211.011-.431, RSMo 1959. (All statutory references herein will be to
RSMo 1959 unless otherwise specifically indicated.)
2. § 452.070.
3. Ch. 532.
4. Ch. 475; § 211.031.
5. See Cook, Adoption Revisited, 27 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1962).
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LAW IN AREA OF CHILD CUSTODY
I.

THE JUVENILE CODE

The present Missouri Juvenile Code was enacted by the 69th General
Assembly and became effective on August 29, 1957. The primary purpose
of this portion of this article is to examine the problems which have been
presented by the appellate cases arising to date under the law and how these
problems have been resolved by the courts, and to forecast some of the
not yet adjudicated problems which may be anticipated most readily. A
review of the history, philosophy and social merits of the law6 are not within
the scope of this article although some comments in these areas will inevitably be made.

A. The Statute
A brief summary of the most fundamental provisions of the Juvenile
Code is, of course, necessary in order to understand the issues raised in the
cases to be discussed and in order to appreciate some of the problems facing
juvenile judges in custody proceedings under the code.
The code provides that the juvenile court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in proceedings involving a child seventeen years of age or
younger who is in need of care and treatment (1) because the persons responsible for the care and support of the child have neglected or refused to
provide such care and support, (2) because the child is otherwise without
proper care, custody or support, (3) because the behavior, environment or
associations of the child are injurious to his welfare or the welfare of otherg,
or (4) because the child is alleged to have violated any state law or municipal ordinance. Jurisdiction also vests in the juvenile court as respects a
minor seventeen years of age or older who is alleged to have violated a state
law or municipal ordinance prior to having become seventeen years of age,
or for the suspension or revocation of an automobile license. The court also
has exclusive jurisdiction for the adoption of any person and for the commitment of a child to the guardianship of the Department of Public Health
and Welfare, as provided by law.7

6. For interesting commentaries on the history, philosophy and development
of the Missouri Juvenile Code, see Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical Development-The Need for New Legislation, 1957 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 17; Weinstein and Robins, The Juvenile Court in Missouri: 1957-59-A
Survey of Current Development and Future Requirements, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 373.

For an excellent symposium on various facets of modern juvenile court acts, see
the July 1959 issue of the National Probationand Parole Association Journal.

7. § 211.031.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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Once the juvenile court has attained jurisdiction over a child, such
jurisdiction is retained until the child reaches twenty-one years of age.8
Nothing in the code shall deprive other courts of the right to determine
legal custody of children upon writs of habeas corpus or to determine legal
custody or guardianship of children when incidental to the determination
of causes pending in other courts. Such questions, however, may be certified
by another court to the juvenile court for hearing, determination or recommendation."
Any child taken into custody for an offense is immediately turned over
to the juvenile court or juvenile officer.10
The juvenile court, in its discretion, may dismiss any petition with
respect to any child fourteen years of age or older who is alleged to have
committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult or
who is alleged to have violated a state or municipal traffic law, or with
respect to a minor seventeen years of age or older who is alleged to have
violated any state law or municipal ordinance if such child came under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court prior to reaching seventeen years of age,
and, in any such case, such child may be prosecuted under the general law.,Whenever anyone informs the juvenile court in person and in writing
that a child appears to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court
makes a preliminary inquiry to determine the facts and to determine whether
or not the interests of the public or the child require that further action be
taken, and, on the basis of this inquiry, the juvenile court may make such
informal adjustments as are practicable without a petition or may authorize
12
the filing of a petition by the juvenile officer.
When a petition is filed, the person who has custody of the child shall
be summoned to appear before the court and, if such person is someone
other than the parent or guardian of the child, then the parent or guardian
must also be notified of the case. If it appears that the child's welfare requires that his custody be immediately assumed by the court, the summons
shall so state and the officer serving the summons shall take the child into
custody at once. Summons may be served personally or, if the juvenile
court finds that it is impracticable to serve summons personally, service by
registered mail to the last known address of the person is authorized.13
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

§ 211.041.
§ 211.051.
§ 211.061.
§ 211.071.
§ 211.081.
§§ 211.101, .111.
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When a child is taken into custody such act is not considered an
arrest.14
There are provisions for the detention of the child under certain circumstances, such provisions being geared to the protection of the child.1"
The juvenile court may cause a child to be examined by a physician,
psychiatrist or psychologist appointed by the court, and for this purpose
the services of state, county or municipal personnel or institutions may be
used and a county may, at the request of the juvenile court, provide proper
16
services in connection with diagnosis and treatment of children.
At any hearing before the court the procedure is determined by the
juvenile court and may be formal or informal, as the court deems desirable.
Testimony may be recorded, if the court shall so determine. Only persons
having a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court are admitted
to hearings. Equity practice and procedures govern proceedings in the
17
juvenile court.
When a child is found by the court to have come within its jurisdiction,
the court shall so decree and make a finding of fact upon which it exercises
its jurisdiction. The court may, by order: (1) place the child back in his
own home or in the custody of a relative or other suitable person upon such
conditions as the court may require; (2) commit the child to the custody
of a public or private agency or institution authorized or licensed by law
to care for children, or commit the child to an institution in another state
willing to receive the child if the appropriate state authorities approve such
commitment, or commit the child to the custody of the juvenile officer; (3)
place the child in a family home; (4) cause the child to be examined and
treated by a physician and placed in a public or private hospital or other
institution for treatment and care; or (5) suspend or revoke a driver's
license.1 8
In placing or committing a child the court shall, when practicable,
select a person, agency or institution which has or is governed by the same
religious faith as that of the parents of the child, or, if the parents' faiths
differ, as the same religious faith of the child, or, if the religious faith of the
child is unascertainable, as the same faith of either of the parents.1 9

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

§ 211.131.
§§ 211.141, .151.
§ 211.161.
§ 211.171.
§ 211.181.
§ 211.221.
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If the court finds that the parents are able to support the child, the
court has power to require such support. 20
Any decree of the juvenile court may be modified on the court's own
motion. Also, the parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next
friend of a child committed to the custody of an institution or agency may
petition the court for modification.21
An appeal is allowed to the child from any final judgment, order or
decree under the Juvenile Code and may be taken on the part of the child
by its parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend. Also,
an appeal may be allowed to any parent from any final judgment affecting
22
the parent.
No adjudication by the juvenile court shall be deemed a conviction,
and no child shall be charged of a crime or convicted unless the case is
transferred to a court of general jurisdiction under the circumstances permitted by the code. Also, evidence in a juvenile case is not lawful or proper
evidence against the child for any purpose whatsoever in any civil or criminal proceeding other than subsequent cases arising under the code.23
No court record shall be inspected without a court order. Similarly,
police records, if any, kept on children are to be kept separate and may not
be inspected by anyone except on court order. Court records on children
24
over twenty-one may be destroyed upon court order.
The code contains provisions for the furnishing and maintenance of detention facilities and personnel, the appointment and qualification of
juvenile officers, and the salary of the juvenile court's staff including the
2
juvenile officers. 1
It is the duty of circuit prosecuting attorneys and city and county
counselors and of police officers, constables, sheriffs and other authorized
persons to give information concerning a child to the juvenile court or the
juvenile officer and to render all assistance and cooperation within their
jurisdictional power which may further the objects of the Juvenile Code.
The court is authorized to seek cooperation of all organizations having for
their object the protection or aid of children. 28

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

§ 211.241.
§ 211.251.
§ 211.261.
§ 211.271.
§ 211.321.
§§ 211.331-.401.

26. § 211.411.
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B. Constitutionality of Juvenile Code

Since the effective date of the code in August, 1957, there have been
two Missouri cases under the act which have dealt with constitutional
questions. In In re V.,27 the court held that those provisions of article
V, section 20, of the Constitution of Missouri providing that magistrates in counties of less than seventy thousand inhabitants shall have concurrent juvenile jurisdiction with the circuit court are not self-executing
and that Section 482.130 of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri, does not
violate the constitutional provision. Section 482.130, enacted by the Missouri Legislature in 1947, confers upon magistrate courts in counties of less
than seventy thousand inhabitants the powers of the circuit judge in chambers when the circuit judge is absent from the county (and does not,
therefore, give the magistrate courts in such counties concurrent juvenile
jurisdiction with the circuit court). Thus, the judgment of the magistrate
court in Franklin County in a habeas corpus proceeding transferring custody
of a minor child to an institution under the alleged authority of the Juvenile
Code was held to be void since the legislature had not conferred such powers
upon magistrate courts. (Actually, the judgment rendered by the magistrate court was rendered under Missouri's prior Juvenile Court Act, but in
its opinion the supreme court cites the present code, implying that the decision is equally as applicable to it.)
A more fundamental constitutional question was decided in Minor
Children of F. B. v. Caruthers.28 In that case the juvenile court, in a proceeding properly initiated under the code, transferred custody of a minor
child to an agency. Pending the appeal from the juvenile court's judgment,
the mother of the child filed a habeas corpus petition in the St. Louis Court
of Appeals, challenging the constitutionality of the code, particularly the
jurisdictional provisions of section 211.031. The petitioner contended that
these provisions violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, section 10, of the
Constitution of Missouri, on the grounds that these provisions were so
vague, indefinite and uncertain that they fixed no ascertainable standard
of conduct regarding the care of children. The court of appeals (after first
accepting jurisdiction of the case, in spite of the pending action in the circuit court, because a constitutional question was involved) acknowledged
that the statute is broad but that it is no more extensive than the juris27. 306 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1957) (en banc).
28. 323 S.W.2d 397 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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diction which has been vested in equity for many years; that the juvenile
court is a court of equity to which the constitution gives jurisdiction over
minors; and that the language of the statute has acquired an accepted legal
meaning.
In a recent article in the Journal of the Missouri Bar,2 9 discussing
secrecy and privacy problems in the juvenile court field, Judge Henry A.
Riederer, juvenile judge for Missouri's Sixteenth Judicial Circuit (Kansas
City), expressed the view that the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, providing in part that criminal prosecutions shall be public,
and similar provisions in state constitutions, are not offended by the Juvenile
30
Code's requirement that juvenile proceedings are not public.
Judge Riederer noted that it has been universally held that juvenile
proceedings under laws similar to Missouri's Juvenile Code are not criminal
proceedings and are, therefore, not governed by constitutional provisions
applicable to criminal proceedings.
The constitutionality of many provisions of the code will inevitably be
frequently challenged. Without seeking to anticipate the bases of any such
challenges, suffice it to say at the moment that at least as respects some of
the more fundamental provisions of the code, decisions of Missouri courts
upholding the constitutionality of former Missouri juvenile laws will be
equally as applicable. For example, in State ex rel. Corella v. Pence,81 the
provision of an earlier act 32 to the effect that the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court shall be retained over a child who has come under the jurisdiction of
the court until the child reaches twenty-one was held not to violate Missouri's constitutional provisions against special laws on the theory that children over eighteen who have not theretofore come under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court could be treated as criminals and would not come
under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. And again, in State ex rel. Matacia
v. Buckner"' an earlier juvenile law"' was held not to be unconstitutional on
the grounds that it denied constitutional protections applicable to trials for
crimes. In that case the court pointed out that the juvenile laws did not
involve procedures for punishing crimes, but that the purpose of the law
29. Riederer, Secrecy or Privacy? Communication Problems in the Juvenile
Court Field, 17 J. Mo. B. 66 (1961).
30. State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S.W. 179 (1923)
(en banc).
31. 262 S.W. 360 (Mo. 1924) (en banc).
32. § 2591 ff., RSMo 1919, as amended by Mo. Laws 1923, at 153.
33. Supra note 30.
34. § 2591, RSMo 1919, as amended by Mo. Laws 1923, at 153.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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was the protection and support of neglected children and the reformation of
delinquent children. In Boyd v. Rutlege 5 the court upheld the constitutionality of the then law3s authorizing the juvenile court in its discretion to
dismiss a delinquency petition and the prosecution of the juvenile under
the general law. The court noted that the classification of some boys as
being subject to criminal prosecution and others of the same age as being
subject to the juvenile act was not fanciful or arbitrary.
It should be observed that, in upholding the constitutionality of earlier
acts, the Missouri courts, in fortifying their specific rulings, have recognized
and leaned upon the doctrine that the state, as parens patriae, has the
power to promote the well-being of its children."'
In all of the cases mentioned above, which arose under earlier acts, the
provisions of the statutes under scrutiny, as well as the constitutional provisions being challenged, were sufficiently similar to the corresponding provisions of the present Juvenile Code and the present constitution that, it is
submitted, they still represent the Missouri law. It is not purported that
these cases represent a complete review of the constitutional cases arising
under earlier Missouri juvenile court acts, but the cases cited do illustrate
the fact that, although there have been but a few constitutional cases decided under the present code, many of the basic constitutional questions
presented by the code have, in all likelihood, already been resolved.
C. Application of Juvenile Code, Custody Proceedings3
In spite of the overriding recognized principle that the court will look
to the best interests and welfare of the child and in spite of the broad
powers and discretion vested in the juvenile court by the code, most of the
cases decided under the code demonstrate judicial insistence on compliance
with the code's procedural provisions and judicial recognition of the applicability of established rules of law and equity.
In State v. Taylor,3 9 the Springfield Court of Appeals reversed the
juvenile court's finding of neglect and transfer of custody of a child to an
agency on the grounds that the petition in the juvenile court proceeding
had been filed by the prosecuting attorney of Howell County and not by
35. 13 S.W.2d 1061 (Mo. 1929).
36. Mo. Laws 1927, at 129-30.
37. See State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, supra note 30; State ex -el. Cave
v. Tincher, 258 Mo. 1, 166 S.W. 1028 (1914) (en banc); Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo.
194, 77 S.W. 508 (1903) (en banc).
38. The reader is again reminded that custody proceedings under the Adoption
Law are not covered in this article.
39. 323 S.W.2d 534 (Spr. Ci App. 1959).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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the juvenile officer as provided in section 211.081 of the code. The court
emphasized the necessity of exact compliance with statutes establishing
procedures permitting the destruction of the parent-child relationship. Similarly, in Skepler v. Shepler'0 the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that a
"Petition for Custody" filed in the circuit court by a child's grandparents
had not been properly instituted under the Juvenile Code, which requires
that petitions thereunder must be filed by the juvenile officer. The circuit
court's award of custody of the child to the grandparents was reversed and
remanded.
Again, in In re C.,41 although affirming the juvenile court's finding and award of custody of the child involved to an agency, the court
stated that it was inclined to dismiss the appeal, since the appeal had not
been in strict compliance with the appeal provisions of the code as set forth
in section 211.261. In this case the appeal had been taken by the attorney
for the child and the court indicated that section 211.261 requires that an
appeal cannot be taken by the child or his attorney, but must be taken by a
parent, guardian, legal custodian, spouse, relative or next friend of the
child. The court stated that it was deciding the question on its merits in
spite of the procedural defect in the appeal because of the importance of
the case to the child, but it certainly cannot be assumed from the language
of the court that it, or any other court, will hereafter ignore any procedural
defect.
In In re M. P. S.,42 the mother of the child appealed from the
judgment of the juvenile court which had declared the child to be neglected and had transferred custody of the child to an agency. The court
of appeals thoroughly reviewed the evidence and held that the evidence in
the case, which was almost entirely circumstantial, was insufficient to justify
the juvenile court's finding of neglect. (The court further held that the
juvenile court should have admitted the testimony of the child's doctor and,
accordingly, it remanded the case to the juvenile court with instructions
to admit the doctor's testimony, the court recognizing that such testimony
might result in evidence which would be sufficient to sustain the court's
finding of neglect.) In the course of the opinion the court pointed out that a
proceeding under the Juvenile Code partakes of the character of a civil case
insofar as appellate review and procedure are concerned; that a finding to
justify recovery on circumstantial evidence must exclude guesswork and
40. 348 S.W.2d 607 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
41. 314 S.W.2d 756 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
42. 342 S.W.2d 277 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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conjecture; that a mother should not be deprived of the care and companionship of her child except for grave reasons and such as are authorized by
legislative enactments; and that whoever seeks to deny a mother her child
has the burden of proof.
The very recent case of Mashak v. Poelker, decided by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals on April 17,. 1962, 43 further illustrates the strictness with
which the appellate courts are prone to interpret the Juvenile Code. In that
case the plaintiff-appellant challenged the authority of the St. Louis juvenile
court to engage and pay the salary of an administrative assistant, since the
Juvenile Code does not specifically provide for such office or the payment of
any salary to any such officer. The opinion centered around the provisions
of section 211.161 and particularly the last sentence of paragraph three,
which provides: "The juvenile court may appoint and fix the compensation
of such professional and other personnel as it deems necessary to provide
the court with proper diagnostic, clinical and treatment services for children under its jurisdiction." The court noted that this entire section dealt
primarily with the court's authority to provide treatment for a child
through medical, psychiatric or other facilities and that in authorizing the
court to appoint and fix the compensation of such professional and other
personnel, as it deems necessary, the statute means personnel of a professional character within the general purport of the section. After an elaborate
recitation of the testimony in the case the court came to the conclusion that
the administrative assistant did not perform services of a character contemplated by the section and that, accordingly, the job of administrative
assistant had not been authorized. The court also pointed out that section
211.381 specifically sets out what employees the juvenile court shall hire
and what their compensation shall be. The court noted that since no office
of the importance of administrative assistant was provided for in this section, no such office was contemplated by the statute.
The court reached this decision while specifically noting that under
section 211.011, the code is to be liberally construed.
Two other cases complete the list of decisions under the new code (not
43. 356 S.W.2d 713 (St. L. Ct. App. 1962). The interest which this case
has generated is indicated by the fact that the Bar Association of St. Louis and
the St. Louis Division of the Missouri Association of Social Welfare have both
filed petitions and been given the right to intervene as amicus curiae in connection
with the defendants-respondents motion for rehearing and motion for transfer to
the Missouri Supreme Court. Aside from the somewhat technical legal issue on
which the case was decided, it is of primary interest as it illustrates the serious
problems of the juvenile courts in obtaining competent staffs and in the payment
of competitive salaries in face of the salary limitations established by the code.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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including cases arising in connection with adoption proceedings). In State
v. Tolias,4' the supreme court held that the trial court in a criminal proceeding had properly excluded testimony tending to show that a witness for the
state had been "convicted" in a juvenile court proceeding and had been
committed to a juvenile institution. The court noted that section 211.271
clearly provides that the disposition of a case in a juvenile court is not a
conviction and may not be shown for any reason whatsoever, including, as
in this case, for the purpose of challenging a juvenile's credibility. And in
the case of In re M., 45 the court of appeals held that the testimony
in the trial court was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding of
neglect and its award of custody of the child to the child's aunt as against
the claim of the child's natural father.40
In the case of InZ re Pope,47 a habeas corpus proceeding now pending
in the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the pleadings suggest or present the
following problems arising under the code:
(1) Is the initiation of a juvenile court proceeding by the filing of a
petition in the juvenile court by the juvenile officer sufficient to meet the
requirements of section 211.081, or does this section, in addition, require
that prior information be given by a person in writing that a child appears
to come within the jurisdiction of the court?
(2) Related to the foregoing question, does an informal report in the
court's file by the social worker in the case constitute the giving of information by a person in writing within the meaning of section 211.081?
(3) Before a petition under section 211.081 can be filed by the juvenile
officer, what is the extent of the preliminary inquiry which the section provides must first be made by the court?
(4) Does the juvenile court have the power upon the filing of a petition by the juvenile officer to grant temporary custody of a child?
(5) Is the service of a subpoena upon the father of a child (who does
not .have custody of the child) to appear at a hearing before the juvenile
court on a petition filed by the juvenile officer sufficient notice to the father
as required by paragraph two of section 211.101?
44. 326 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1959).
45. 329 S.W.2d 247 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959).
46. This article does not discuss the various factors which juvenile courts
have considered in determining the merits of a case. Of course, the evidence in
cases such as In re M., supra note 45, and cases under earlier acts, where the
courts do rule on the matter of neglect or other basis for the courts' assuming
jurisdiction and in connection with the award of custody, vary considerably.
47. No. 31155 (undecided).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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It is apparent from the foregoing review of the problems .presented or
suggested in the cited cases that the vast majority of these problems are
procedural or jurisdictional, and undoubtedly there will continue to be presented to the courts a substantial number of other unresolved procedural
and jurisdictional questions until the case law under this relatively new
statute has become more abundant and settled. It is quite clear, however,
that the small volume of case law to date reflects a very definite trend that,
in spite of the code's admonition that it should be liberally construed (section 211.011), and in spite of the broad powers which the code vests in the
juvenile court, and in spite of the fact that the urgency with which a
juvenile court must often act does not afford the opportunity for adequate
reflection on the part of the judge or for the careful detailed attendance
to procedural safeguards which are characteristic of most types of judicial
proceedings, the courts will interpret the code strictly at least insofar as
procedural and jurisdictional provisions are concerned. It is suggested,
therefore, that it may be dangerous to place undue confidence in many
of the broad provisions of the code, at least as far as procedural and jurisdictional matters are concerned, and that the juvenile courts, their staffs
and counsel appearing before them, as well as social agencies involved in
juvenile court proceedings, should take all practicable steps to assure that
the technical and procedural provisions of the code are complied with.
The cases give little guide as to how the more substantive provisions
of the code will be construed and, in particular, how strictly the appellate
courts will scrutinize the exercise by the juvenile courts of their broad
discretionary powers. In re M. P. S.,48 indicates clearly that appellate
courts will carefully review the evidence in juvenile court proceedings
as in other equity cases and that juvenile courts will not be given carte
blanche authority to exercise even their broad discretionary powers in
any manner which cannot be fully justified, upon appeal, by the
evidence in the case. In this connection, although the court has the power
to hold informal hearings and not to record testimony (unless a party in
the proceedings requests such recording), absence of recorded testimony
could prove troublesome if the record in the case is not otherwise sufficient
for an appellate court to review the basis of a juvenile court's judgment or
decree; and it would seem that the juvenile courts and other interested
parties would want to assure that the record is at least sufficient for appellate review even in respect to hearings which may be informal.
48. Supra note 42.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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As indicated above, cases decided under the new code have not yet
been concerned to any substantial extent with the code's more substantive
provisions. Although it is not the purpose of this article to anticipate the
areas in this regard which will in due course prove troublesome, the case
of In re Slaughter49 is here mentioned to point out a situation with respect
to which certain juvenile judges have informally manifested concern and to
illustrate the type of problems with which the juvenile courts may expect to be confronted. In the Slaughter case the child had been adjudicated neglected by the juvenile court under the prior Juvenile Court Act 50
and placed under the supervision of the Welfare Department which, in turn,
had placed the child in the custody of foster parents. Two years later the
foster parents filed a petition for adoption which the natural mother defended. The adoption court, after finding that the child had been abandoned
or neglected by the mother, entered its adoption decree. On appeal by the
mother the Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed. The real problem suggested in this case concerns the impact of a custody award pursuant to a
so-called "neglect petition" (as compared to an award of custody in connection with an adoption petition) upon a subsequent adoption proceeding
initiated by the foster parents. It is not uncommon in such a situation that,
at the time of the original custody award, adoption is not contemplated
and that, accordingly, no consent to adopt the child is sought from the
natural parents. However, the foster parents over a period of time become
endeared to the child and, in due course, seek to adopt it only to find that
the natural parents object, even though they may have manifested no
particular interest in the child between the period from the original custody
award and the filing of the adoption petition. Circumstances may well indicate that it is in the best interests of the child to grant the adoption, but
the court cannot, of course, ignore the rights of the natural parents to the
child. This situation represents a most difficult human as well as legal problem, and there appears nothing in either the adoption law or the Juvenile
Code which affords guidance to suitable solution. The seriousness of this
type of problem suggests that the employment of the new statute on termination of parental rights ", could, in proper cases, be employed at the time
of the hearing on the original "neglect petition" with the view of forcing
the natural parents, who have "neglected" their child, to lose their parental
rights so that the door may be opened for suitable foster parents, in due
49. 290 S.W.2d 408 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956).
50. Ch. 211, RSMo 1949.
51. §§ 211.411-.511 (Mo. Laws 1959, H.B. 437).
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course, to adopt the child without interference by the natural parents. The
courts will, no doubt, employ the Termination of Parental Rights Act with
temerity, as this law provides a most "extraordinary remedy" in authorizing
a court, under stated conditions, to terminate a parent's rights to his child,
but, it is submitted, if employed under proper circumstances, it could well be
a constructive vehicle in happily resolving many problems of the type suggested above.
In concluding this discussion the authors would like to commend the
diligence with which the juvenile courts in Missouri are proceeding to seek
to resolve the many problems confronting them as the administration of
this new law is passing through its difficult embryonic stage. Not only have
many of the juvenile courts made considerable progress in organizing competent staffs (in spite of the low salary limitations for professional and semiprofessional personnel which the code imposes), but also, through the Missouri Counsel of Juvenile Judges, they are seeking in a constructive manner
to exchange their views and experiences, to establish uniform practices
and to resolve within the framework of the code many of the procedural
and jurisdictional problems which, without such understanding and cooperation on the part of the judges, would undoubtedly become even more
difficult of resolution.
II.

CUSTODY PROBLEMS IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

The divorce court, in the exercise of its statutory power as arbiter of
child custody, operates within a socio-economic area with far-reaching
consequences not only upon parties litigant but also upon the public. In
the exercise of this power the primary issue confronting the court is the
substantive determination of the disposition of child custody. In the solution of this central problem the court is not, and should not be, constrained
within the strict limits of a narrow construction of its statutory power. Both
the tenor and the underlying intent of the empowering statute clearly demonstrate that the divorce court, in determining the child custody question,
must be free to make that disposition which is consonant with the best
welfare of the child. It is apparent, therefore, that any attempt to list and
discuss the factors utilized by courts in arriving at a determination regarding disposition of child custody would be of no avail. The courts, although
voicing their opinions within recognized juridical phraseology, 2 base their
52. Decisions in this state amply illustrate the recurrent recitation by courts
of established propositions regarding child custody as supplementary to and supporting, as distinguished from determining, the disposition of custody. The reader's
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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decisions upon an appraisal of the factual context surrounding a custody
problem and are clearly not circumscribed in this decision by established
legal precedents or maxims regarding the disposition of child custody. It is
not our purpose herein to recount the vague concatenations of factors prosaiattention is directed to the following familiar statements reiterated by the courts
in their opinions on the custody question.
Neither parent has a paramount right to custody but all things being equal the
custody of children of tender years will usually be awarded to the mother.

Davis v. Davis, 354 S.W.2d 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962); S. v. G., 298
S.W.2d 67 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957); In re Richardet, 280 S.W.2d 466 (St. L. Ct. App.
1955); .Ex parte Ferone, 267 S.W.2d 695 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954); Lehr v. Lehr, 264
S.W.2d 35 (Spr. Ct. App. 1954); Wilson v. Wilson, 260 S.W.2d 770 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1953); Ex parte Lofts, 222 S.W.2d 101 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949); Rex v. Rex,
217 S.W.2d 391 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Irvine v. Aust, 193 S.W.2d 336 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1946); Lane v. Lane, 186 S.W.2d 47 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945); Mothershead v.
Mothershead, 236 Mo. App. 737, 161 S.W.2d 669 (K. C. Ct. App. 1942); Wells v.
Wells, 117 S.W.2d 700 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203
(Spr. Ct. App. 1938); Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de
Sion, 232 Mo. App. 597, 109 S.W.2d 73 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937); Abel v. Ingram,
223 Mo. App. 1087, 24 S.W.2d 1048 (Spr. Ct. App. 1930); Knepper v. Knepper,
139 Mo. App. 493, 122 S.W. 1117 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).

Custody will ordinarily be awarded to parents as opposed to third parties;
there must be special circumstances or extraordinary reasons to justify disposition
of custody to third parties.

In re Wakefield, 365 Mo. 415, 283 S.W.2d 467 (1955) (en banc); ex parte
Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920) (en banc); Le Claire v. Le Claire, 352
S.W.2d 379 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961); Neustaedter v. Neustaedter, 305 S.W.2d 40 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1957); I. v. B., 305 S.W.2d 713 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957); McCoy v.
Briegel, 305 S.W.2d 29 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957); State v. Pogue, 282 S.W.2d 582
(Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Long v. Long, 280 S.W.2d 690 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Ex
parte Ferone, supra; Swan v. Swan, 262 S.W.2d 312 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Stricklin
v. Richters, 256 S.W.2d 53 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); Wilson v. Wilson, supra; Cox v.
Carapella, 246 S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952); Vance v. Vance, 203 S.W.2d 899
(St. L. Ct. App. 1947); Ex parte De Castro, 238 Mo. App. 1011, 190 S.W.2d 949
(St. L. Ct. App. 1945); McDevitt v. Morrison, 180 S.W.2d 608 (Spr. Ct. App.
1944); Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, 170 S.W.2d 697 (St. L. Ct. App.
1943).
In awarding custody, where neither parent is unfit insofar as custody is concerned, the best interest of the child will be served by an arrangement enabling
associationwith both parents.

Davis v. Davis, supra; Lewis v. Lewis, 301 S.W.2d 861 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957);
Fago v. Fago, 250 S.W.2d 837 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952); Watkins v. Watkins, 230
S.W.2d 778 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Lambert v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 544 (St.L.
Ct. App. 1949); Lane v. Lane, supra; Olson v. Olson, 184 S.W.2d 768 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1945); Martin v. Martin, 160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Baer v.
Baer, 51 S.W.2d 873 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1927); Hartman v. Hartman, 277 S.W. 950 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925);
Kaplun v. Kaplun, 227 S.W. 894 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); Nations v. Nations, 201
Mo. App. 639, 213 S.W. 511 (St. L. Ct. App. 1919).
In disposing of the custody question where there is more than one child of the
parties involved, the court should attempt to avoid separating the children in nahing its custody award.

Davis v. Davis, supra; L. v. N., 326 S.W.2d 751 (Spr. Ct. App. 1959);
Poor v. Poor, 237 Mo. App. 744, 167 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942); Tuter v.
Tuter, supra; Fisher v. Fisher, 207 S.W. 261 (St. L. Ct. App. 1918).
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cally utilized by the courts in supplementing their determinations regarding
child custody questions but to present and discuss problem areas affecting
the child custody question arising in and growing out of divorce proceedings.
These problems center upon and are concerned with the nature and extent
of the divorce court's power with regard to the child custody question, and
the exercise of this power as affected by the jurisdictional requisites upon
which the exercise of this power is predicated.
A. The Nature and Extent of the Divorce Court's Powers
The power of the circuit court, as a divorce court, to determine custody
questions is contained within Section 452.070 of the 1959 Revised Statutes
of Missouri. The language of this section is quite general; it provides, in
terms similar to that of its statutory predecessors, 53 as follows:
When a divorce shall be adjudged, the court shall make such order
touching the alimony and maintenance of the wife, and the care,
custody and maintenance of the children, or any of them, as, from
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, shall be
reasonable ....
This statute vests in the circuit court a broad discretion with regard to the
disposition of child custody and contains no inherent limitations upon the
exercise of that discretion other than that the custody award shall be reasonable in regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
case. Decisions in the child custody area indicate that the courts fully
recognize the wide area of discretion which they possess in awarding child
custody,54 although in the majority of cases the courts do not expressly ad53. § 2375, RSMo 1909; § 1519, RSMo 1939; § 1355, RSMo 1929; § 1806,
RSMo 1919.
54. In re Wakefield, supra note 52; Ex parte Sangster, 295 Mo. 49, 244 S.W.
920 (1922) (en banc); Ex parte Badger, supra note 52; Le Claire v. Le Claire, supra
note 52; Tootle v. Tootle, 329 S.W.2d 218 (K.C. Ct. App. 1959); McCoy v. Briegel,
supra note 52; S. v. G., supra note 52; Graves v. Wooden, 291 S.W.2d 665 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1956); State ex rel. McKenzie v. La Driere, 294 S.W.2d 610 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1956); Hensley v. Lake, 274 S.W.2d 493 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Pope v. Pope,
267 S.W.2d 340 (St. L. Ct. App. 1954); Davis v. Davis, 254 S.W.2d 270 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1953); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Link v. Link, 262 S.W.2d 318
(St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Hensley v. Hensley, 233 S.W.2d 42 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950);
Shepard v. Shepard, 194 S.W.2d 319 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946); Drew v. Drew, 186
S.W.2d 858 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945); Ex parte De Castro, supra note 52; Burgess v.
Burgess, 239 Mo. App. 390, 190 S.W.2d 282 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945); Olson v. Olson,
supra note 52; Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, supra note 52; Hess v. Hess,
232 Mo. App. 825, 113 S.W.2d 139 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); Rone v. Rone, 20 S.W.2d
545 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458
(Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Ruedlinger v. Ruedlinger, 222 Mo. App. 819, 10 S.W.2d 324
(St. L. Ct. App. 1928); Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 52; Cole v. Cole, 256 S.W. 518
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vert to the broad nature of this power. It is clear that a determination that
one parent or the other shall prevail in the divorce proceedings is not controlling in the custody question 5 and that the court, in determining custody,
will make its award upon a factual determination effectuating the best interest and welfare of the child. Nor is the court in making its award limited
to a consideration of the merits of one parent or the other as a prospective
custodian; it may, and where necessary will, award custody to third personsoo not parties to the divorce proceedings or to an institution or welfare

(Spr. Ct. App. 1923); Sabourin v. Sabourin, 213 S.W. 490 (St. L. Ct. App. 1919);
Waters v. Gray, 193 S.W. 33 (St. L. Ct. App. 1917); Freeman v. Freeman, 94 Mo.
App. 504, 68 S.W. 389 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902); Brown v. Brown, 53 Mo. App. 453
(K.C. Ct. App. 1893).
See also, In re Wakefield, supra note 52; Ex parte Sangster, supra (court refused to intervene by habeas corpus to compel defendant to return child to Missouri after having removed child during pendency of divorce proceedings on ground
divorce court has power to make appropriate custody orders pendente lite); In re
Morgan, 117 Mo. 249, 21 S.W. 1122 (1893) (en banc) (dissenting opinion at 22
S.W. 913 (divorce court may award custody although petition and cross-bill-for
divorce dismissed where motions for new trial pending); Ex parte Lofts, supra note
52; Shepard v. Shepard, supra (supporting the proposition that the circuit court
can make temporary custody awards pending final adjudication of the divorce
although the statute does not expressly empower the court to make custody awards
pendente lite); Smith v. Smith, 151 Mo. App. 649, 132 S.W. 312 (Spr. Ct. App.
1910). Cf. King v. King, 42 Mo. App. 454 (K.C. Ct. App. 1890) (holding that trial
court erred in hearing and determining husband's motion for custody where wife's
petition for divorce dismissed and motion for new trial overruled and her appeal
was pending).
55. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932) (en banc); Lusk v.
Lusk, 28 Mo. 91 (1859); Davis v. Davis, 354 S.W.2d 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962);
L. v. N., supra note 52; Paxton v. Paxton, 319 S.W.2d 280 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958);
McKenzie v. McKenzie, 306 S.W.2d 588 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957); Thomas v. Thomas,
288 S.W.2d 689 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956); Martin v. Martin, supra note 52; Baer v.
Baer, supra note 52; Tossier v. Tossier, 33 S.W.2d 995 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931);
Bedal v. Bedal, 2 S.W.2d 180 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928); Hartman v. Hartman, supra
note 52; Freeman v. Freeman, supra note 54.
The courts have recognized that from a practical standpoint a finding for one
party to a divorce action means no more than that his or her conduct or character
was not such as would entitle the other party to a divorce. See Elgin v. Elgin,
301 S.W.2d 869 (St., L. Ct. App. 1957); Cadenhead v. Cadenhead, 265 S.W.2d 426
(K.C. Ct. App. 1954); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 255 S.W.2d 441 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953);
Politte v. Politte, 230 S.W.2d 142 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950); Rowland v. Rowland,
227 S.W.2d 478 (St. L. Ct. App. 1950).
Contrast the general statement found in a number of cases that custody is
usually awarded to the prevailing party in the divorce action. Wilson v. Wilson,
supra note 52; Fite v. Fite, 196 S.W.2d 65 (Spr. Ct. App. 1946); Irvine v. Aust,
supra note 52; Wells v. Wells, supra note 52; Tuter v. Tuter, supra note 52; Ellis
v. Johnson, 218 Mo. App. 272, 260 S.W. 1010 (Spr. Ct. App. 1924).
56. Ex parte Sangster, supra note 54; Le Claire v. Le Claire, supra note 52;
Hensley v. Lake, supra note 54; Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Burgess v. Burgess,
supra note 54; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54; Parks v. Cook, 180 S.W.2d 64 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1944); Lewis v. Lewis, supra note 52; Abel v. Ingram, supra note 52;
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agency.5 7 In the majority of cases involving an award of custody to third

parties, such as maternal or paternal grandparents or other relatives of the
parents, the propriety of awarding custody to such third persons ordinarily
has been suggested to the court by one of the parties to the divorce proceeding;58 however, under its broad statutory power the divorce court may,
sua spo-nte, determine that neither of the contesting parents is entitled to
custody and that it would best suit the welfare of the child to award its
custody to some third party or to an institution or agency.-" In addition, in
disposing of custody, the divorce court has wide latitude in shaping its orders
in order to assure the carrying out of the provisions of the decree and the
effectual realization of the child's welfare. 60
Ruedlinger v. Ruedlinger, supra note 54; Madigan v. Madigan, 260 S.W.2d 485
(St. L. Ct. App. 1924); Cole v. Cole, supra note 54; Tines v. Tines, 216 S.W. 563
(St. L. Ct. App. 1919); Waters v. Gray, supra note 54.
57. Ex parte Sangster, supra note 54; McCoy v. Briegel, rupra note 52;
Shepard v. Shepard, supra note 54; Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, supra
note 52; Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, supra note 52.
58. See, e.g., Hensley v. Lake, supra note 54; Parks v. Cook, supra note 56;
Waters v. Gray, supra note 54.
59. McCoy v. Briegel, supra note 52; Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Shepard
v. Shepard, supra note 54; Ex parte De Castro, supranote 52; Lewis v. Lewis, supra
note 52; Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, supra note 52;
Ex parte Badger, supra note 52.
60. Custody awards may, and do, contain such additional incidental matters
as the court deems necessary to insure the effective operation of its decree. See,
e.g., Pope v. Pope, supra note 54 (decree modified to prevent father from creating
religious conflict in child's mind and fostering religious barriers between child and
mother); Link v. Link, supra note 54 (father required to pay all arrearages due
under support provisions of decree as a condition to the maintenance of his motion
to modify custody); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52 (express provision that child
not be removed from state); Hensley v. Hensley, supra note 54 (general statement
regarding court's .power to insure carrying out of its orders regarding custody);
Drew v. Drew, supra note 54 (requiring nonresident grandparents to whom custody
was awarded to execute a formal "submission to jurisdiction" with regard to future
modifications of the decree); Olson v. Olson, supra note 52 (preventing removal);
Fernbaugh v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 1200, 163 S.W.2d 999 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942)
(express prohibition against removal of child from Missouri); Martin v. Martin,
233 Mo. App. 667, 125 S.W.2d 943 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939) (custody divided equally
between father and mother with express provision that child be kept at home of
paternal grandparents); Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion,
supra note 52 (providing that parents should comply with rules and regulations of
institution to which custody of child awarded); Baer v. Baer, supra note 52 (preventing removal); Rone v. Rone, supra note 54 (modification by court, of its own
motion, to prevent removal of child from Missouri); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W.
196 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927) (preventing removal of child from city of St. Louis or
St. Louis County); Nunnink v. Nunnink, 257 S.W. 832 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924)
(decree modified expressly providing that father shall not visit child where said
visits shown to have disruptive effect); Sabourin v. Sabourin, supra note 54
(custody awarded to father and paternal grandparent jointly with express provision
that child be kept at grandparent's home); Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo. App. 697,
154 S.W. 825 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913) (modification of award to insure father's
compliance with mother's visitation rights); Freeman v. Freeman, supra note
54 (preventing removal).
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The recent case of McCoy v. Briegel6- expressly recognizes the plenary
power of the divorce court with regard to the disposition of custody. In
that case, the trial court determined, in a default divorce proceeding, that
the litigant wife was not a proper party for the award of custody and that,
in fact, she would be unable to take care of the children properly should
their custody be awarded to her. This determination was made by the court
of its own motion, and it subsequently awarded custody of the children to a
social welfare agency with instructions that that agency procure foster
home care for the children. The St. Louis Court of Appeals specifically held
that such an award was clearly within the trial court's jurisdiction under
the broad grant of discretion with regard to child custody contained in
Section 452.070 of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri. The court specifically adverted to the fact, which is impliedly recognized in all custody
proceedings, that the divorce court in awarding custody is clearly not limited
to a consideration of the equities of the parents as parties litigant in a suit
between them.6 2
In consonance with the existence of a broad power in the trial court
over the custody question in divorce proceedings it is generally stated that
a full and complete appraisal of the factual context surrounding the custody
question, including detailed examination of the prospective custodians, is
requisite to the disposition of custody. 3 Procedural treatment 6 and the

61. 305 S.W.2d 29 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
62. The litigant wife contended in the trial court and on appeal that the
divorce court, as a basis for its custody award, had determined on its own that the
children were neglected and homeless at the time of institution of the divorce action. She contended that such an order, based on a finding as aforesaid, could
only properly be made in a proceeding under the Juvenile Code under the provisions
therein for dealing with neglected and delinquent children. The court of appeals
held such contention untenable, stating that the fact that the Juvenile Code provides
proceedings for the disposition of such children does not divest the divorce court
of jurisdiction to determine the question of the welfare of such children. Id. at
35. See note 11 supra and text supported thereby.
63. S. v. G., supra note 52; Dansker v. Dansker, 279 S.W.2d 205 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1955); In re Richardet, supra note 52; Link v. Link, supra note 54; Crooks
v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 678, 197 S.W.2d 689 (St. L. Ct. App. 1946); Shepard v.
Shepard, supra note 54; Fembaugh v. Clark, supra note 60; Tomlinson v. French
Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, supra note 52; Nations v. Nations, supra note
52 (custody question cannot be determined by referral to a referee); In re
Krauthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
64. The custody award is treated as a separable incident distinct and apart
from the divorce decree; a party aggrieved by the custody award may appeal this
aspect of the divorce proceedings alone. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 983, 218
S.W.2d 566 (1949); Schwer v. Schwer, 50 S.W.2d 684, 50 S.W.2d 686 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1932); Laweing v. Laweing, 21 S.W.2d 2 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Sanders v.
Sanders, supra note 54; Phipps v. Phipps, supra note 60.
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broad scope of appellate review in regard to custody questions attest to
and supplement this requirement. The scope of appellate review of custody
awards is similar to that appertaining in other equity proceedings; that is,
the court will review the evidence de novo and make that determination
with regard to custody which it deems appropriate under the facts and circumstances. Although the appellate court will, of course, defer to the findings of the trial court, especially where the testimony is conflicting, it is
clear that it will, with painstaking accuracy, review all the evidence and
make that determination with regard to custody which it deems best in the
light of the child's welfare and interest.The jurisdiction of the divorce court with respect to custody and the
other separable incidents of the marital relationship, such as alimony, support, and maintenance, is a "continuing" one. The court rendering an adjudication of the custody question in a divorce proceeding thus retains a
limited jurisdiction with regard to custody to modify its order in that regard until the majority of the child or the death of one of the parties to the
divorce proceeding. 66 The divorce court thus has jurisdiction to hear and
determine subsequent motions to modify the provisions of the original
65. Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962); Davis v. Davis,
354 S.W.2d 526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962); Ezell v. Ezell, 348 S.W.2d 592 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1961); Le Claire v. Le Claire, supra note 52; Tootle v. Tootle, supra note 54;
Doll v. Doll, 327 S.W.2d 501 (St. L. Ct. App. 1959); White v. White, 312 S.W.2d
167 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958); Ragan v. Ragan, 315 S.W.2d 142 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958);
Birrittieri v. Swanston, 311 S.W.2d 364 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958); I. v. B., supra
note 52; Edwards v. Edwards, 302 S.W.2d 37 (K.C. Ct. App. 1957); Graves v.
Wooden, supra note 54; Hachtel v. Hachtel, 291 S.W.2d 201 (Spr. Ct. App. 1956);
Long v. Long, 280 S.W.2d 690 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955); Hensley v. Lake, supra note
54; Ackermann v. Ackermann, 280 S.W.2d 425 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955); Pope v.
Pope, supra note 54; Cherry v. Cherry, 272 S.W.2d 700 (Spr. Ct. App. 1954);
Davis v. Davis, 254 S.W.2d 270 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Frame v. Black, 259
S.W.2d 104 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); Fago v. Fago, supra note 52; Mayo v. Mayo,
244 S.W.2d 415 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951); Fordyce v. Fordyce, 242 S.W.2d 307 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1951); Garvey v. Garvey, 233 S.W.2d 48 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Greenbury v. Greenbury, 223 S.W.2d 153 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949); Parks v. Cook, supra
note 56; Tuter v. Tuter, supra note 52; Baer v. Baer, supra note 52; Lampe v.
Lampe, 28 S.W.2d 414 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930); Rone v. Rone, supra note 54;
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 7 S.W.2d 427 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928); Haagen v. Haagen, 11
S.W.2d 757 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928); Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 60; Hill v. Hill,
277 S.W. 961 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925); Nunnink v. Nunnink, supra note 60; Kaplun
v. Kaplun, 227 S.W. 894 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); Milster v. Milster, 200 Mo. App.
603, 209 S.W. 620 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919).
66. In re Wakefield, supra note 52; Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo; 545, 252 S.W.2d
323 (1952); Kelly v. Kelly, supra note 55; Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 201,
271 S.W. 481 (1925); Ex parte Sangster, supra note 54; Davis v. Davis, 354 S.W.2d
526 (Spr. Ct. App. 1962); S. v. G., supra note 52; McCoy v. Briegel, supra
note 52; Graves v. Wooden, supra note 54; Tripp v. Brawley, 261 S.W.2d 508 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1953); Middleton v. Tozer, 259 S.W.2d 80 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Garvey
v. Garvey, 233 S.W.2d 48 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Watkins v. Watkins, supra note
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custody award handed down at the time of rendition of the divorce decree.
This limited jurisdiction of the divorce court may be invoked only by one
of the parties to the original divorce proceeding. 7 The motion to modify
is regarded as independent of and separate from the divorce proceeding;""
it is treated as a petition in an original action and, to be sufficient, must
52; Schumm v. Schumm, 233 S.W.2d 122 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949); Schumacher v.
Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d 841 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949); State ex rel. Walker v. Crouse,
240 Mo. App. 389, 205 S.W.2d 749 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947); Cervantes v. Cervantes,
239 Mo. App. 932, 203 S.W.2d 143 (Spr. Ct. App. 1947); Crooks v. Crooks, supra
note 63; Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, supra note 52; Martin v. Martin,
160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Morgens v. Morgens, 164 S.W.2d 626 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1942); Lewis v. Lewis, 167 S.W.2d 417 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942); Zamzow
v. Zamzow, 159 S.W.2d 346 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Krueger v. Krueger, 107
S.W.2d 967 (Spr. Ct. App. 1937); Salkey v. Salkey, 80 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1935); Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 54; Thornton v. Thornton, 221 Mo. App.
189, 2 S.W.2d 821 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1927); Hartman v. Hartman, supra note 52; Tatum v. Davis, 144 Mo.
App. 125 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925); In re Krauthoff, supra note 63; Wald v. Wald,
168 Mo. App. 377 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912); Phipps v. Phipps, supra note 60; Shannon
v. Shannon, 97 Mo. App. 119 (K.C. Ct. App. 1902); Meyers v. Meyers, 91 Mo.
App. 151 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
See also Robinson v. Robinson, 268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916) (this continuing jurisdiction with regard to custody is sufficient to enable the court to hear
and determine five years after rendition of decree a motion by nonresident mother
to modify original award and provide support payments for nonresident child
where original decree contained nothing with regard to support). Cf. Edwards
v. Engledorf, 180 S.W.2d 603 (Spr. Ct. App. 1944) (erroneously holding that
divorce court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the custody question
although one of parents had died).
67. Jack v. Jack, 295 Mo. 128, 243 S.W. 314 (1922) (en banc) (third parties
cannot file motion for change of custody or join in such a motion through intervention); Neustaedter v. Neustaedter, supra note 52 (only original parties to divorce suit are proper parties to motion to modify and no other person can properly
litigate modification); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Schumacher v. Schumacher,
supra note 66 (grandparents could not intervene in divorce action or file or join
in motion to modify); Hupp v. Hupp, 238 Mo. App. 964, 194 S.W.2d 215 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1946); Drew v. Drew, supra note 54 (father could not object to modification
on ground parental grandparents who were originally granted custody were not
made parties to the motion to modify, since they have no standing as such); Sabourin v. Sabourin, supra note 54. Cf. Tripp v. Brawley, supra note 66 (statement
in a habeas corpus proceeding in which court refused to adjudicate custody question that third parties, grandparents of child, can file in the divorce court a motion
to modfiy on the ground that mother, to whom the court awarded custody, is unfit).
68. Procedurally, the motion to modify is in the nature of an independent
proceeding to determine the substantive rights of the parties on the basis of evidence
relating to facts after rendition of the original decree. A motion for new trial in
the modification proceeding is, therefore, necessary to enable the appellate court
to review that proceeding de novo. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66; Arnold v. Arnold,
222 S.W. 996 (Mo. 1920) (en banc); Olson v. Olson, supra note 52; Tossier v.
Tossier, supra note 55; Rudd v. Rudd, 223 Mo. App. 472, 13 S.W.2d 1082 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1929); Cole v. Cole, supra note 54: Vordrick v. Vordrick, 226 S.W. 59 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1920); Steele v. Steele, 85 Mo. App. 224 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900);
Deidesheimer v. Deidesheimer, 74 Mo. App. 234 (St. L. Ct. App. 1898).
The motion is a "civil suit" within the meaning of that term as used in the
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state a cause of action within the court's continuing jurisdiction., It is,
therefore, necessary that the motion to modify show upon its face facts
indicating a material change of circumstances and conditions since the
rendition of the original custody award.7 0 In order to secure a requested
change in the custody provision the movent must prove facts showing a
material change of circumstances and conditions after rendition of the
custody award 7' and must demonstrate that this change is such as to warrant the requested modification in the light of the best interest and welfare

statutory provisions authorizing change of venue. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66,
overruling Cole v. Cole, 89 Mo. App. 228 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901), Robinson v. Robinson, supra note 66, and State ex rel. Reece v. Moore, 158 S.W.2d 747 (Spr. Ct. App.
1942), which cases held the change of venue provisions inapplicable to modification
proceedings on the theory that such proceedings were merely a continuation of the
original action and supplementary thereto and thus not within the terms of the
change of venue statutes.
In such a, proceeding proper notice to the adverse party is requisite. Hayes v.
Hayes, supra note 66; Laumeier v. Laumeier, supra note 66; Jack v. Jack, supra
note 67; Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Burgess v. Burgess, supra note 54; Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 60; Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66; Kaestner v.
Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); State ex rel.
Tatum v. Ramey, 134 Mo. App. 722, 115 S.W. 458 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
69. Hayes v. Hayes, 153 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1941); North v. North, 339 Mo.
1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936); Hensley v. Lake, supra note 54; Cherry v. Cherry,
supra note 65; Samland v. Samland, 277 S.W.2d 880 (K.C. Ct. App. 1955);
Luethans v. Luethans, 243 S.W.2d 801 (St. L. Ct. App. 1951); Wilton v. Wilton,
235 S.W.2d 418 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Shepard v. Shepard, supra note 54; Olson
v. Olson, supra note 52; Tossier v. Tossier, supra note 55; Sanders v. Sanders, supra
note 54; Nunnink v. Nunnink, supra note 60; Steele v. Steele, supra note 68.
70. Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Fordyce v. Fordyce, supra note 65;
Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Mahan v. Mahan, 239 Mo. App. 317, 192 S.W.2d
626 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 185 S.W.2d 845 (Spr. Ct. App.
1945); Mothershead v. Mothershead, supra note 52; State ex rel. Scott v. Harris,
136 S.W.2d 78 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940); Foster v. Foster, 146 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1940); Martin v. Martin, 233 Mo. App. 667, 125 S.W.2d 943 (K.C. Ct. App.
1939); Hess v. Hess, supra note 54; Salkey v.. Salkey, supra note 66; Abel v.
Ingram, supra note 52; Newlon v. Newlon, 6 S.W.2d 669 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928);
Bedal v. Bedal, supra note 55; Ruedlinger v. Ruedlinger, supra note 54; Eaton v.
Eaton, 237 S.W. 896 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
* 71. Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Garvey v. Garvey, 233 S.W.2d 48 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1950) (attempt to remove child from one parent's influence as changed
condition); Wilton v. Wilton, supra note 69; Olson v. Olson, supra note 52; Martin
v. Martin, 160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Krueger v. Krueger, supra
note 66 (concealment of child from other parent as a ground for modification);
Baer v. Baer, supra note 52; Lampe v. Lampe, supra note 65; Weniger v. Weniger,
32 S.W.2d 773 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930) (showing of interference with operation of
original decree established change of conditions as ground for modification); Rone
v. Rone, supra note 54 (custodian's conduct in denying other parent's visitation
rights is a ground for modification of custody as a changed condition); Hull v.
Hull, 280 S.W. 1059 (Spr. Ct. App. 1926); Rhodes v. Rhodes, supra note 65; Haagen
v. Haagen, supra note 65; Hartman v. Hartman, supra note 52; Kaplun v. Kaplun,
supra note 65 (showing mother's actions prejudicing child against father);
Sabourin v. Sabourin, supra note 54.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5

22

Lewis and Tockman: Lewis: Status of the Missouri Law in the Troubled Area of Child Custody
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 27

of the child affected thereby.7 2 The court may modify the original custody
award in that manner which it deems consonant with the best interest and
welfare of the child; it is clearly not limited to that modification requested
by the moving party.73 It may, and will, make such modification, swa sponte,
as it deems advisable;14 and this is the rule although the other party to the
custody award does not object to the change requested by the moving party.
The cases demonstrate that here, as well as in the original divorce proceedings, the divorce court exercises a wide discretion with respect to the disposition of the custody question. The exercise of this discretion by the divorce court is subject to the de novo review of the appellate court as in the
original proceedings.
It is interesting to observe that, when the courts follow a logical extension of the theoretical basis upon which the motion to modify is grounded,
the result, in many instances, is a restriction upon the operation of the
court's practical function in hearing and determining such motions. Substantively the motion is considered to be in the nature of an independent
proceeding wherein the rights of the parties regarding a change in the
custody provisions are determined upon the basis of evidence restricted to.
facts arising after rendition of the original divorce decree and custody
award.15 It follows, therefore, that evidence regarding facts and circumstances prior to the initial adjudication of the custody question in the divorce proceeding is not admissible in hearing the motion to modify, on the
72. S. v. G., supra note 52 (conduct of parent seeking to instill fear, disrespect, or hatred in child for other parent is sufficient basis for modification);
Luethans v. Luethans, supra note 69; Green v. Perr, 238 S.W.2d 924 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1951); Watkins v. Watkins, supra note 52; Williams v. Williams, 211 S.W.2d.
740 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Olson v. Olson, supra
note 52; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54; Parks v. Cook, supra note 56; Lewis' v.
Lewis, 167 S.W.2d 417 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52

(demonstration of any disrespect or disregard for the terms of the custody decree
by the parent awarded custody is significant, not only as a changed condition, but
also as a factor in passing upon the welfare of the child); Mothershead v. Mothers-

head, supra note 52 (motion showing that father, who was awarded custody originally, had abandoned child to paternal grandparents warranted modification of
award); Martin v. Martin, 160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Ct. App. 1942); Hill v. Hill,
supra note 65; Nunnink v. Nunnink, supra note 60; Barnhart v. Barnhart, 253
S.W. 56 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923); Sabourin v. Sabourin, supra note 54; Waters v.
Gray, supra note 54; In re Krauthoff, supra note 63; Phipps v. Phipps, supra note
60; West v. West, 94 Mo. App. 683 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
73. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66; S. v. G., supra note 52; Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Shepard v. Shepard, supra note 54; Baer v. Baer, supra note 52;
Eaton v. Eaton, supra note 70; Phipps v. Phipps, supra note 60.
74. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66; Shepard v. Shepard, supra note 54; Lewis.
v. Lewis, supra note 72; Rone v. Rone, supra note 54.
75. See notes 69 and 70 supra and text supported thereby.
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ground that the divorce decree is res judicata as to those matters. 8 The
resultant exclusion of matters which transpired prior to entry of the divorce
decree on the basis of strict application of the res judicata doctrine directly
impedes the broad scope of inquiry necessary to a proper adjudication of the
custody question. Disposition of custody is predicated upon factual examination and consideration of the moral character, conduct and circumstances
of those vying for the custody award. Limitation of the basis for examination to matters occurring after rendition of the divorce decree eliminates the
availability of matters necessary to a knowledgeable and meaningful determination of the custody problem. The impropriety of such a restriction
upon the scope of inquiry in modification proceedings is forcefully demonstrated upon consideration of the practicalities of divorce proceedings. In
the majority of divorce cases the complaint contains numerous general
allegations regarding the conduct and character of both parties and the
decree rendered is ordinarily a general one containing no specific findings
of fact with regard to these matters. Moreover, in a great number of divorce
proceedings the complaint does not contain any matters going to the moral
character and conduct of the parties where such can be avoided and the
decree is, therefore, often silent in this regard. Application of the res
judicata doctrine, in restricting evidence on a motion to modify to matters occurring after rendition of the divorce decree on the ground that
factors material to the disposition of custody arising before the decree were
considered and determined in the divorce proceeding, is therefore often
premised upon an unreal assumption.
Decisions involving motions to modify impliedly recognize the inapplicability of strict operation of the doctrine of res judicata in this area.
These cases hold in effect that, although the subject of inquiry in a modification proceeding is whether the substantive rights of the parties require

76. In re Wakefield, supra note 52; Jack v. Jack, supra note 67; S. v. G.,
supra note 52; Samland v. Samland, supra note 69; Ackermann v. Ackermann,
supra note 65; Lehr v. Lehr, supra note 52; Cherry v. Cherry, supra note 65;
Frame v. Black, supra note 65; Montgomery v. Montgomery, 257 S.W.2d 189 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1953); Fago v. Fago, supra note 52; Fordyce v. Fordyce, supra note 65;
Brake v. Brake, 244 S.W.2d 786 (Spr. Ct. App. 1951); Schumm v. Schumm, supra
note 66; Lambert v. Lambert, supra note 52; Hawkins v. Thompson, 210 S.W.2d
747 (Spr. Ct. App. 1948); Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Shepard v. Shepard,
supra note 54; Mahan v. Mahan, s'pra note 70; Armstrong v. Armstrong, supra
note 70; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54; Foster v. Foster, supra note 70; Martin v.
Martin, 125 S.W.2d 943 (K.C. Ct. App. 1939); Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66;
Salkey v. Salkey, supra note 66; Baer v. Baer, supra note 52; Abel v. Ingram, supra
note 52; Rone v. Rone, supra note 54; Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 54; Haagen
v. Haagen, sutpra note 65; Newlon v. Newlon, supra note 70.
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modification of custody because of new facts since rendition of the original
decree, the scope of that inquiry must be sufficient to assure protection of
the child and its welfare. Where it is apparent from a consideration of the
tenor of the original decree that the rendering court did not actually adjudicate the custody question but merely incorporated the agreement of the
parties with regard to custody, evidence relating to the conduct and character of the parties before the decree will be allowed where material to the
custody question. 7 The basis of this exception to the operation of res judicata is that although a divorce decree, like other judgments, is conclusive
not only as to matters actually adjudicated but also as to matters which
might properly have been litigated but were not, the position of the child
as a ward of the court and the continuing duty of the court to protect its
welfare requires a determination based upon all material facts whether before or after entry, of the divorce decree.78 Similarly, where it is demonstrated
that facts material to the disposition of custody, existing at the time of the
divorce decree, were concealed from or unknown to the rendering court, inquiry into these matters is permissible.7 Although courts vary in regard to
the extent to which inquiry into pre-decree matters is permissible, the majority hold that pre-decree matters are admissible where they relate to the
moral character, propriety and circumstances of the prospective custodian8 0
M

In the recent case of S. v. G.8 ' the Springfield Court of Appeals
acknowledges this uncertainty regarding the nature of the inquiry in

77. Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Newlon
v. Newlon, supra note 70; Eaton v. Eaton, supra note 70; In re Krauthoff, supra
note 63.
78. In re Wakefield, supra note 52; Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; In re
Krauthoff, supra note 63.
79. In re Wakefield, supra note 52; S. v. G., supra note 52; Sanders v.
Sanders, supra note 54; Ellis v. Johnson, supra note 55.
80. Hurley v. Hurley, 284 S.W.2d 72 (Spr. Ct. App. 1955) (evidence regarding
father's pre-divorce conduct admissible where directly bearing upon his moral
character); Dansker v. Dansker, supra note 63; Link v. Link, supra note 54 (on
motion to modify, morals of both parents are proper subject of inquiry); Garvey
v. Garvey, supra note 65; Watkins v. Watkins, supra note 52 (evidence of movantmother's pre-decree relationship with another man held admissible, especially in
view of fact she had subsequently married this man and her remarriage was basis
for her motion to modify original award to father); Rex v. Rex, 217 S.W.2d 391
(K.C. Ct. App. 1948); Drew v. Drew, supra note 54 (evidence of character and
fitness of movant admissible although such evidence goes behind the divorce decree); Davis v. Davis, 192 S.W.2d 41 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945) (evidence of movantmother's pre-decree adultery admissible because it goes to issue of her fitness for
custody award; evidence relating to father's "sexual appetite" and excessive sexual
demands upon mother prior to divorce held inadmissible because not material to
the custody issue).
81. 298 S.W.2d 67 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957).
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regard to past affairs when determining a motion to modify. In this
case it is pointed out that a court, when confronted with the custody
question on a motion to modify, must determine, first, whether there
has been a material change of circumstances and conditions since rendition of the original custody award and, secondly, whether these changes
call for any modification of the custody award in order to promote the
child's best interests. In determining the existence of a material change in
facts and circumstances, it is necessary that the court considering the motion' to modify be informed as to the facts and circumstances existing at the
time the original decree was rendered. The court noted that in the majority
of divorce cases the complaint contains numerous allegations and the divorce decree predicated upon such complaint is usually a general one containing no specific findings of fact. The court observed that, in the absence
of such specific findings of fact, a court considering the motion to modify
would be precluded from ascertaining the facts and circumstances existing
at the time of the original decree unless it could hear evidence regarding
conduct and circumstances prior to the divorce. Once it has been determined
that there has been a material change of facts and circumstances since
rendition of the original decree the court may then consider the second and
controlling issue-whether such change demonstrates that a modification of
the original custody award is necessary to effectuate the best interests and
welfare of the child. The court states, in considering the scope of inquiry
necessary, that:
[E]ach case must stand upon its own factual situation; . . . the
inquiry in respect to circumstances prior to the decree should extend so far, and only so far, as is necessary to inform the court of
the actual situation and circumstances which existed at the time
the decree was rendered, also as to those traits of character (and in
some instances, physical and mental conditions) which might be of
permanent nature or which are so recent in occurrence or demonstration as to leave the possibility of their continued existence,
which traits of character are of such nature that there is a reasonable possibility that they may affect the welfare of the child. 2
It is submitted that, from a practical standpoint, the rule laid down by
the Springfield Court of Appeals with regard to the proper scope of inquiry
in considering a motion to modify is the correct one. If a court is properly
to perform its function in ascertaining and promoting the best interests and
welfare of children subject to its jurisdiction, it must be able to acquaint it82. Id. at 76.
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self with the facts and circumstances existing prior to the original decree as
well as thereafter, in order to ascertain whether there has been a material
change in facts and circumstances since rendition of the original decree and
to determine whether a change in the custody award should be made and
the nature of the modification necessary.
B. The Exercise of a Divorce Court'sPower as Affected by
JurisdictionalProblems
Treatment of the motion to modify as an original action independent
of the divorce proceeding in which the custody award was rendered is not
adhered to in all phases of the custody problem. Substantively the motion
is considered to be a continuation of the original (divorce) proceeding insofar as the jurisdictional basis of the court to hear and dispose of such
motions is in issue.13 If the court rendering the divorce decree had jurisdiction inr limine to adjudicate the custody question, its jurisdiction over questions affecting custody, arising subsequent to rendition of the original decree, is held to continue during the minority of the child unless terminated
earlier by the death of one of the parties to the divorce proceeding.84 The
courts regard this "retained" jurisdiction as the base upon which to hear
and determine subsequent motions to modify the original custody award,
notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the motion either the party
adversely situated to such motion or the child affected by such motion,
or both, are without the physical jurisdiction of the court. 85 Where a court
83. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66; State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, 357 Mo.
134, 206 S.W.2d 558 (1947) (en banc); Kelly v. Kelly, supra note 55; Robinson v.
Robinson, supra note 66; Williamson v. Williamson, 331 S.W.2d 140 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1960); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63;
Lewis v. Lewis, supra note 72; Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66; Sanders v.
Sanders, supra note 54; Ruedlinger v. Ruedlinger, supra note 54; Thornton v.
Thornton, supra note 66; Hill v. Hill, supra note 65; Nunnink v. Nunnink, supra
note 60; Barnhart v. Barnhart, supra note 72; Eaton v. Eaton, supra note 70; Phipps
v. Phipps, supra note 60.
84. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 66; Robinson v. Robinson, supra note 66;
S. v. G., supra note 52; Graves v. Wooden, supra note 54; Middleton v. Tozer,
supra note 66; Garvey v. Garvey, supra note 71; Schumacher v. Schumacher, supra
note 66; Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Rone v. Rone, supra note 54; Conrad v.
Conrad, supra note 52; Shannon v. Shannon, 97 Mo. App. 119, 71 S.W. 104 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1902); Cole v. Cole, supra note 68.
85. State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047 (Mo. 1924) (en banc);
Robinson v. Robinson, supra note 66 (movant-mother and child residing and
domiciled in Oregon); Williamson v. Williamson, supra note 83 (adverse party to
motion and child domiciled in Georgia); Hachtel v. Hachtel, supra note 65; Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66 (dictum); Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 52; Shepard
v. Shepard, supra note 54; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54 (movant-mother's motion
to modify granted where children residing in Rhode Island); Fernbaugh v. Clark,
supra note 60 (father forcibly seized children in 'Louisiana where they were
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proceeds .with and determines a motion to modify in such a situation, the
party purportedly aggrieved thereby cannot raise objection to the court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate the modification but may only object on the
non-jurisdictional ground that he did not receive proper notice of the
pendency of the motion.Y' Cases in this area turn upon the sufficiency of
the notice to the opposite party. For example, notice to the opposing
party's attorney of record (in the divorce proceeding) is sufficient where it
is demonstrated that there is in existence, at the time of the motion, an
attorney-client relationship between the opposing party and his attorney
of record. 7 The cases indicate generally that that notice which is consonant with concepts of due process will be sufficient and that where such
is demonstrated the court may properly modify the original custody award
although thereby affecting one not within the physical jurisdiction of the
court."" Where the notice given does not comport with theoretical concepts
of due process, any modification of the original custody award will be
negated, although the opposing party in fact had actual notice of the
pendency-of the modification proceeding.89
The viability of the "retained" jurisdiction theory with regard to the
rendering court's ability to hear and determine subsequent motions to
modify the custody provisions of a divorce decree although the persons
affected thereby are outside the court's physical jurisdiction is demonstrated
in a plethora of cases involving the disposition of custody. In original di.
vorce proceedings as well as in modification proceedings the courts have
awarded custody to non-residents" or have allowed the party awarded
domiciled and brought them to Missouri); Riesenmey v. Riesenmey, 155 S.W.2d
505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941) (dictum); Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66; Sanders
v. Sanders, supra note 54; Nunnink v. Nunnink, supra note 60; Eaton v. Eaton,
supra note 70 (children residing in California at time of motion); In re Krauthoff,
supra note 63.
86. Jack v. Jack, supra note 67; Williamson v. Williamson, supra note 83;
Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Burgess v. Burgess, supra note 54; Fernbaugh v.
Clark, supra note 60; Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66; State ex rel. Tatum v.
Ramey, supra note 68.
87. Burgess v. Burgess, supra note 54 (where movant served notice on opposing party's attorney of record in divorce proceeding movant had burden of proof
to establish that attorney-client relationship was in existence at time of motion);
Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 60.
88. Kelly v. Kelly, supra note 55; Williamson v. Williamson, supra note 83;
Crooks v. Crooks, supra note 63; Burgess v. Burgess, supra note 54; Fembaugh v.
Clark, supra note 60; Tossier v. Tossier, supra note 55 (dictum).
89. Williamson v. Williamson, supra note 83; Fernbaugh v. Clark,,supra note
60.
90. Graves v. Wooden, supra note 54 (modification proceeding); Lane v.
Lane, supra note 52 (modification proceeding); Drew v. Drew, supra note 54
(divorce proceeding); Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 60; In re Krauthoff, supra
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5

28

Lewis and Tockman: Lewis: Status of the Missouri Law in the Troubled Area of Child Custody
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 27
custody to remove the child from Missouri, 91 stating generally that removal
of the child from the state is not a taking of the child beyond the jurisdiction of the court in the sense that the rendering court would thereby lose
jurisdiction to change its order in the future should circumstances so require. 2 Both the grant of custody to non-residents and the allowance of removal upon the "retained" jurisdiction theory are predicated upon two basic
assumptions by the rendering court: (1) that the parents, as parties to the
original (divorce) proceeding, are personally bound by the rendering
court's orders and decrees; 9 3 and, (2) that the orders and decrees of the
rendering court will be controlling upon and recognized in the courts of
other states.04
Although stating that it is against the policy of the law to allow removal
of the child from the state,95 the majority of cases consider this policy as
note 63 (modification proceeding); Brown v. Brown, supra note 54 (divorce proceeding).
91. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 350 S.W.2d 116 (K.C. Ct. App. 1961); Williamson
v. Williamson, supra note 83; Frame v. Black, supra note 65; Fago v. Fago, supra
!note 52 (modification proceeding); Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 60 (modification
proceeding); Hartman v. Hartman, supra note 52; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66;
Freeman v. Freeman, supra note 54.
In this connection it should be noted that our courts hold that where the
decree is silent as to removal of the child from the state and does not specifically
prohibit such removal, the party to whom custody has been awarded may lawfully
remove the child without securing the consent of the granting court prior thereto.
Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66 (civil contempt proceeding); Shreckengaust
v. Shreckengaust, 219 S.W.2d 244 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949); Rone v. Rone, supra
note 54; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66; In re Krauthoff, supra note 63 (dictum).
92. S. v. G., supra note 52 (dictum); Dansker v. Dansker, supra note 63
(juvenile court proceeding); Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66; Lane v. Lane,
supra note 52; Riesenmey v. Riesenmey, supra note 85; Sanders v. Sanders, supra
note 54; Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 60; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66; In re
Krauthoff, supra note 63.
On the same theory it is generally held that the fact that the party awarded
custody has removed, or intends to remove, the child from the state is not a sufficient basis for the modification of a custody award silent in this regard; modification on such a ground will only be allowed where it is demonstrated that the purpose and effect of such removal is to deprive the other parent of his rights of visitation or association with the child. Green v. Perr, supra note 72; Garvey v. Garvey,
supra note 66; Shepard v. Shepard, supra note 54; Olson v. Olson, supra note 52;
Rone v. Rone, supra note 54; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66.
93. Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54; Lane
v. Lane, supra note 52; Krueger v. Krueger, supra note 66; Sanders v. Sanders,
supra note 54; Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 60; Hartman v. Hartman, supra
note 52; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66; In re Krauthoff, supra note 63.
94. In re Krauthoff, supra note 63; Drew v. Drew, supra note 54; Conrad v.
Conrad, supra note 60; Tatum v. Davis, supra note 66; Hartman v. Hartman,
supra note 52; Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 54.
95. State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, supra note 85; Graves v. Wooden, smtpra
note 54; Hachtel v. Hachtel, supra note 65; Dansker v. Dansker, supra note 63;
Frame v. Black, supra note 65; Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66; Fago v. Fago,
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one grounded upon the rendering court's position with relation to the child
whose custody has been adjudicated by it, rather than as a policy grounded
upon the recognition of defects in the retained jurisdiction theory. These
decisions stress the fact that the rendering court upon obtaining jurisdiction over a child and its future welfare (through the initial adjudication
of the custody question) assumes a position with regard to that child
analogous to guardianship, requiring close supervision, and that, therefore,
any impedimeht to or intereference with this close supervision (such as
would result upon removal of the child from the state) must be supported
by a strong showing that the supervening consideration of the child's welfare requires removal.96
Other decisions in this area, proceeding upon a realistic appraisal of
the practicalities of removal of the child from the state, recognize the distinction between a theoretical jurisdiction to adjudicate future custody problems and judicial power to determine such problems.97 Generally, however,
the courts, in awarding custody to non-residents and in allowing the removal of the child from the state, do not appear to consider that the basic
premises underlying the "retained" jurisdiction theory have any inherent
weakness.
The apparent faith of our courts in the extra-territorial effectiveness of
custody decrees and orders, manifested in decisions awarding custody to
non-residents and allowing removal of the child outside the state, is premised
upon the assumption that courts of sister states will recognize and enforce
such decrees and orders. Decisions in Missouri and recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States with regard to the applicability of the
supra note 52; Brake v. Brake, supra note 76; Green v. Perr, supra note 72; Hartman v. Hartman, supra note 52; Garvey v. Garvey, supra note 66; Watkins v.
Watkins, supra note 52; Lane v. Lane, supra note 52; Wells v. Wells, supra note 52;
Rone v. Rone, supra note 54; Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 60; Wald v. Wald,
supra note 66.

96. Hachtel v. Hachtel, supra note 65; Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66;
Dansker v. Dansker, supra note 63; Green v. Perr, supra note 72; Watkins v. Watkins, supra note 52; Wald v. Wald, supra note 66.
97. I. v. B., supra note 52; Ackermann v. Ackermann, supra note 65;
Baer v. Baer, supra note 52; Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 54; Jennings v. Jennings, 85 Mo. App. 290 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900) (absence of child from state will
deprive court of power to make future orders); Edwards v. Edwards, 84 Mo. App.
552, 554 (St. L. Ct. App. 1900) (the court should hesitate from allowing removal
of the child outside the state for the obvious reason that it would thereafter have
no power proprio vigore to enforce any orders it might deem necessary). And
see, Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra note 91 (decree modified, granting temporary
custody to nonresident father, conditioned upon his posting of a bond conditioned upon compliance with custody provisions of decree as long as he remains
nonresident).
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full faith and credit clause to custody awards seriously challenge the
validity of this underlying assumption, demonstrating that it is misplaced,
if not completely unrealistic.
C. Missouri Cases on Extra-Territorial Recognition
The tenuous character of the statements by the courts of Missouri with
regard to the extra-territorial validity of custody decrees and orders is
poignantly demonstrated by decisions involving the jurisdictional base
necessary to adjudication of the custody question. These cases disclose a
marked distinction between the situation in which Missouri is the rendering court and that in which Missouri is in the position of the enforcing court
confronted with a subsisting order or decree of another state.
Decisions in Missouri wherein the issue is the power of a Missouri
court, as the rendering court, to adjudicate the custody question in a divorce proceeding, turn upon one of two theories in considering whether the
jurisdictional factors necessary to that adjudication have been established.
Cases in this area, relying upon the theory that the custody question is
one involving a determination of personal rights between the parties to
the divorce proceeding, hold that in personam jurisdiction of the parents
gives the court the power to determine the custody question, the domicile
or physical location of the child being immaterial.98 Other decisions, viewing the custody question as a proceeding quasi-in rem involving the determination of status of the child, hold that domicile of the child in Mis98. In Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 54, the plaintiff instituted a divorce
proceeding through constructive service upon defendant, living and domiciled in
another state; the children were residing with defendant and domiciled in that state.
Plaintiff, after obtaining ex parte divorce decree and custody award, went to that
state and forcibly seized the children, bringing them to Missouri. Defendant subsequently filed motion to modify the custody award in the Missouri court. The
Springfield Court of Appeals held that although the original custody award was
invalid because of lack of jurisdiction, the divorce court obtained jurisdiction to
determine custody in the modification proceeding because it had personal jurisdiction of the parents, defendant parent having personally submitted to the jurisdiction
of the rendering court (by filing the motion to modify). See also Laumeier v.
Laumeier, supra note 66; Poole v. Poole, 287 S.W.2d 372 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956)
(dictum).
In State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, supra note 85, the wife had been granted a
Missouri divorce. Three years thereafter the husband filed a motion in the
rendering court to re-open the proceedings in order to determine whether a
child born subsequent to the divorce was his; the husband prayed alternatively in the motion that he be awarded custody should the court determine
that he was the father of the child or, should the court determine that he was not,
that the court enjoin his former wife and her present husband from asserting any
claim against him for child support. At the time of this motion the former wife,
her present husband and the child were living and domiciled in New York; service
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souri provides the necessary jurisdictional base for the adjudication of
custody, notwithstanding the absence of in personam jurisdiction over both
parents.19 A third jurisdictional theory upon which the ability to determine
custody questions is predicated is that the state, as parens patriae, has
sufficient interest in the welfare of any child found within its territorial
jurisdiction to support its disposition of that child's custody, whether or not

upon the former wife was obtained by publication. Upon the wife's application for
writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from hearing the ex-husband's motion,
the supreme court held that the court had jurisdiction to proceed on the ground
that it had in personam jurisdiction over both parents (the former wife had
entered her appearance by consenting to and participating in the taking of depositions on the merits of the motion). The court noted that the fact that the child
was not, and had never been, within the state of Missouri was immaterial.
See also Ex parte Sangster, supra note 54 (dictum); Jack v. Jack, supra note 67
(dictum that custody decree fixes the respective rights of the parents); In re Morgan, supra note 54 (dictum); State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d 534 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1961) (dictum); Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960)
(entry of appearance by defendant wife, domiciled with children in Illinois, in Missouri divorce proceeding gives court necessary in personam jurisdiction to dispose of
custody); In re Rice, 316 S.W.2d 329 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958) (statement of theory);
Middleton v. Tozer, supra note 66 (dictum); Daugherty v. Nelson, 241 Mo. App.
121, 234 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950) (custody proceedings are in personam
for the purpose of fixing the reciprocal rights of the parents with regard to the
child); Schumacher v. Schumacher, supra note 66 (determination of the rigkt ol
custody between claims of parents); Drew v. Drew, supra note 54 (where both
parents are personally present before the rendering court the physical location of
the child is immaterial); Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 60; Kaestner v. Kaestner,
supra note 68 (dictum).
99. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949) (en banc);
Bernstein v. Bernstein, 351 S.W.2d 46 (K.C. Ct. App. 1961) (ex parte divorce
decree and custody award; constructive service upon defendant parent, child within
state); Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484 (1908) (dictum); State ex rel. Miller v.
Jones, supra note 98 (dictum); In re Rice, supra note 98; McCoy v. Briegel,
supra note 52 (service by publication upon defendant; ex parte custody
award of child present in state); State ex rel. Stoffey v. La Driere, 273 S.W.2d
776 (St. L. Ct. App. 1954). (Defendant wife was outside Missouri with children when plaintiff husband obtained ex parte divorce and custody award upon
constructive service. Court found that defendant mother, although without the
state, had not changed her Missouri domicile and that therefore the children in her
custody also remained domiciled in Missouri. Court states that rendering court has
power to award custody to a parent resident in Missouri although the other parent
is absent from the state with the children, provided that absent parent has not
changed domicile and therefore that child's domicile continues in Missouri. The
continuing domicile of the child in Missouri gives the court power to determine its
status.); Dansker v. Dansker, supra note 63 (dictum-juvenile court proceeding);
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98 (statement of theory); Crooks v. Crooks, supra
note 63, at 682 (in granting divorce the court has the power, if the children are
within its jurisdiction, to make an order concerning their custody); Martin v.
Martin, supra note 76; Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S.W. 746 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1913) (dictum); Kaestner v. Kaestner, supra note 68 (ex parte divorce
decree and custody award upon constructive service on defendant parent; child
physically present in Missouri).
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such child is domiciled in the state.100 Although there are no Missouri
decisions specifically positing jurisdiction to render a custody award on
this last-mentioned basis, cases indicate that. this physical presence theory
has not been rejected as a possible nexus upon which to ground the court's
ability to determine the disposition of child custody.' 0 '
Our courts apparently do not consider the theory of personal jurisdiction over the parents and the theory of domicile of the child as mutually exclusive bases for the rendition of custody decrees. 10 2 On the contrary, it is
clear that either in personam jurisdiction over the parties to the divorce
proceeding or jurisdiction of the child's domicile is sufficient to enable Missouri courts to adjudicate the custody question. 0 3 This conclusion is supported by the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Missouri on that issue. In Beckmam v. Beckmunn, ' plaintiff wife instituted
divorce proceedings against defendant husband who was, at that time, residing in California with the children of the parties. A divorce and custody
of the children were granted to plaintiff after constructive service by publication was obtained upon defendant. The supreme court, in rejecting defendant's contention that the rendering court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody question, noted that defendant had not been personally
served nor had he appeared or participated in the divorce proceedings. The
court stated, however, that it had been established in the divorce proceedings that defendant, although physically absent from the state, had not
changed his Missouri domicile 05 and that, therefore, the Missouri domicile
100. See, e.g., McMillin v. McMillin, 114 Colo. 247, 158 P.2d 444 (1945);
Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 At. 1 (1936); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,
148 N.E. 624 (1925); Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1948);
Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W.2d 165 (1938). See also Annot., 4
A.L.R.2d 7 (1949).
101. Beckmann v. Beckmann, supra note 99 (dictum); State ex fez. Miller v.
Jones, supra note 98 (implied); In re Rice, supra note 98 (our courts apparently
determine custody questions on the basis of domicile, although not disclaiming
jurisdiction based upon the child's presence within the state); Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98, at 360; Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458
(Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
102. State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, supra note 98; Weiler v. Weiler, supra note
98; In re Rice, supra note 98; State ex rel. Stoffey v. La Driere, supra note 99;
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98.
103. See notes 98 and 99 supra and text supported thereby.
104. 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949) (en banc).
105. In the divorce proceeding defendant husband filed a special appearance, objecting to the court's jurisdiction to proceed with the case. The basis of defendant's
objection was that "'defendant is temporarily in the State of California and is
detained there on account of ill health.'" (Emphasis added.) Id. at 1032, 218
S.W.2d at 568. The supreme court construed this statement as a judicial admission
supporting the conclusion that defendant was still domiciled in Missouri. Id. at
1033, 218 S.W.2d at 569.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

33

1962]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 5
LAW IN AREA OF CHILD CUSTODY

108
In
of the children, who were in defendant's actual custody, continued.
disposithe
determine
to
had
jurisdiction
court
rendering
the
holding that
tion of custody, notwithstanding the absence of defendant husband and
the children from the state, the court stated:

[T]he status as to ... [the children's] custody was a thing or res
within the jurisdiction of the court even though the children were
physically without the state. Since such status was within the
court's jurisdiction, the court was authorized to deal with it, and
the judgment awarding custody was a proper exercise of judicial
power and therefore valid. And inasmuch as the status was within
the jurisdiction of the court the fact defendant was served by publication did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. 107
The language of the opinion in the Beckmanm case, considered in its
entirety, clearly demonstrates that the court did not decide that domicile
of the child is the only basis upon which to predicate the power to adjudicate
the custody question.108 The decision has been so construed by other courts
in this state, holding that Beckmann does not rule out in personam jurisdiction of the parents as a basis for rendering a valid custody award, notwithstanding the child may be domiciled in another state.' 0' These decisions
demonstrate the existence of multiple jurisdictional bases which these courts
consider sufficient for the disposition of custody.
Apparently the only situation in which the courts will not proceed to
adjudicate the custody question is that obtaining where there has been constructive service upon the absent defendant parent and the child is not

106. 'The child's domicile is ordinarily that of the father. Where the parents
separate and establish separate domiciles, the child takes that of the parent with
whom he in fact resides. Weiler v. Weiler, supra note 98; State ex rel. Stoffey v.
La Driere, supra note 99; Daugherty v. Nelson, slpra note 98.
The Beckmann case discusses § 1526, RSMo 1939, the statutory precursor of
present § 452.150, RSMo 1959, providing that custody of the child when parents
separate, and pending adjudication, shall remain with the parent having actual
custody.
107. 358 Mo. at 1033, 218 S.W.2d at 569.
108. The Restatement and several leading text writers have adopted the view
that the state of the child's domicile is the only one which has jurisdiction to award
custody. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICt OF LAWS §§ 117, 145-48 (1934); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 144.3, at 717- (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 132, at 358
(1927); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7, 14 (1949), 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 439 (1950).
109. State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, supra note 99; Weiler v. Weiler, supra note
98; In re Rice, supra note 98. In Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98, at 131, 234
S.W.2d at 359, the court stated: "While the ... decision in the Beckmann case ...
is based on the domicile theory, it cannot be stated with certainty that our Supreme
Court has made an exclusive choice between the theories which have developed to
determine the basis for jurisdiction in such cases."
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within the state. 10 Even this limitation upon the jurisdiction of Missouri
courts to adjudicate the custody question is qualified, however, in that
should the defendant parent subsequently enter his appearance or participate
in the proceedings on the merits in any manner the in personam jurisdiction
resultant from such conduct will be held to remedy the initial lack of
jurisdiction although the child remains outside the state. 1 The recent case
of Weiler v. Weilere2 involved a divorce suit instituted by the husband, a
resident of Missouri, against his wife, living and domiciled in Illinois.
Constructive service of the petition praying for custody of the children,
inter alia, was obtained upon the defendant in Illinois. The children were
at that time in the actual custody of defendant, and the court specifically
noted that the children were at all times continually domiciled in Illinois.
Defendant, although not physically present in Missouri, filed an answer
alleging as a defense that she had obtained a divorce and custody in
Illinois. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that defendant's personal
appearance in the action by filing a defensive pleading remedied any jurisdictional defect that existed initially in regard to determination of the custody
question. In basing the power to determine custody upon in personam
jurisdiction over the parents, the court stated,
It appears logical that the court having jurisdiction over both
parents should have jurisdiction to determine and to award the
custody of their children. A multiplicity of suits would otherwise
result, and the best interest of the children would not thereby be
served, . .. 13
There are no cases in Missouri, involving the issue of the power of
our courts to render a custody decree, holding or even intimating that
there is only one jurisdictional basis upon which authority to adjudicate
the disposition of custody may properly be predicated. On the contrary,
as heretofore indicated, it is clear that our courts will proceed to render

110. Beckmann v. Beckmann, supra note 99; State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall,
supra note 85; State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, supra note 98; Weiler v. Weiler, supra
note 98; In re Rice, supra note 98; State ex rel. Stoffey v. La Driere, supra note 99;
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Drew v. Drew, 186 S.W.2d 458 (K.C. Ct. App.
1945); Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 101.
111. Laumeier v. Laumeier, supra note 66; State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall,
supra note 85; State.ex rel. Miller v. Jones, supra note 98; Weiler v. Weiler, supra
note 98; Poole v. Po.ole, supra note 98; Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Drew
v. Drew, supra note 110; Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 101.
112. 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Ct. App. 1960).
113. Id. at 168-69.
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custody awards upon any one of three jurisdictional theories, 1 4 stating
generally that none of these are mutually exclusive.
I However, where Missouri is in the position of the forum state, confronted with the issue of enforcement of the custody award of another
rendering state, recognition of the existence of more than one jurisdictional
basis upon which adjudication of custody may properly be grounded is not
readily extended. Although there is a paucity of decisional law on this point
in Missouri, the general rule stated in those cases that have considered the
problem is that Missouri will enforce the custody awards of sister states,
where the rendering court had jurisdiction of both the parties to the divorce
action and of the subject matter. 11 5 It is clear that in stating this rule regarding the extra-territorial validity of custody awards in Missouri, our
courts do not use "and" in the disjunctive. Furthermore, in referring to
jurisdiction over the subject matter the clear import is that the rendering
court must have domiciliary jurisdiction over the children whose custody is
awarded and further that such jurisdiction does not obtain upon mere
physical presence of the child within the foreign rendering state.""
Recognition of the validity of a foreign state's custody decree or order
in Missouri may well be denied although the rendering court proceeded
upon a jurisdictional base which our courts have considered sufficient to
vest in them the authority to dispose of the custody question initially.
In re Rice- 7 vividly demonstrates that where the custody decree of a sister
state is based upon something less than in personam jurisdiction of the
parties to the divorce action and domicilliary jurisdiction over the child,
enforcement of a custody decree rendered in the divorce proceeding will be
denied. In this case the husband and wife resided in Virginia with their
children. Shortly after his wife left Virginia with their children, plaintiff husband instituted divorce proceedings in Virginia seeking, inter alia, custody of
the children. Defendant wife filed an answer and cross-bill for divorce in the
Virginia proceeding. After a trial on the merits in Virginia, both parties
being personally present, that court awarded custody to plaintiff husband.
Armed with his custody award the husband instituted habeas corpus
114. See notes 98, 99 and 101 supra and text supported thereby.
115. See State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, supra note 98; In re Rice, supra note 98;
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98 (implied); Ex parte Lofts, 222 S.W.2d 101
(Spr. Ct. App. 1949); Shreckengaust v. Shreckengaust, supra note 91; In re Leete,
205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920).
116. Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Ex parte Lofts, supra note 115; In re
Leete, supra note 115.
117. 316 S.W.2d 329 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958).
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proceedings in Missouri (where the wife had been residing with the children
since her departure from Virginia) contending that the Virginia decree was
res judicata with regard to the rights of father and mother to custody
and entitled to full faith and credit. In the habeas corpus proceeding, the
court held that the Virginia decree should not be enforced, on the ground
that the decree affirmatively showed on its face" 8 that the Virginia court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody question. The court here noted
that the evidence in the Virginia proceedings and the decree rendered
therein recited that defendant wife was a resident of Missouri and that the
children were at no time after commencement of the divorce proceedings
physically present in Virginia. In the enforcement action the court noted
the three jurisdictional theories upon which courts have premised their
ability to adjudicate the custody question, stating that under the in personam theory Virginia would have had authority to determine the disposition of custody. Notwithstanding the existence of many decisions in Missouri
wherein custody had been awarded on such basis, 119 the court held that
Virginia's decree, insofar as it awarded custody, was not binding and proceeded to determine the disposition of custody for itself.
The decision in the Rice case with regard to the extra-territorial validity
of custody provisions in a divorce decree demonstrates that the forum state
does not consider itself bound by the determination of the rendering state
in that regard. In discussing applicability of the full faith and credit clause,
the court indicates that it is not required thereunder to enforce "blindly"
the custody provisions of an otherwise valid divorce decree.' 20 Although
paying deference to the full faith and credit clause, the essence of the
decision is that this court does not consider that clause applicable to the

118. Questions regarding the propriety of collateral attack in the forum state
against the judgment of the rendering state are without the scope of this article.
It should be noted, however, that our courts generally hold that where the judgment is attacked for infirmities apparent on the record, such attack, although collateral, is proper. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 450 (Mo. 1922) (en bane). Similarly, the judgment of another state may be collaterally attacked on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction even though it appears in the judgment record that the court
had jurisdiction and extrinsic evidence is necessary to establish its invalidity.
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Ex parte Lofts, supra note 115. See also Leichty
v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 354 Mo. 629, 190 S.W.2d 201 (1945) (en bane).
The latter rule is predicated upon the policy that foreign judgments may always
be collaterally attacked for fraud in the procurement; where there is no contention
of fraud in the procurement of the judgment, jurisdictional findings of the rendering court are subject only to direct attack by appeal or writ of error. State ex rel.
Stoffey v. La Driere, supra note 99. Cf. Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98.
119. See note 98 supra and text supported thereby.
120. 316 S.W.2d 329, at 332.
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disposition of custody. The court does not look to the law of the rendering
state to determine whether under the law of that state the jurisdictional
facts requisite to valid adjudication were, in fact, extant; 121 the decision is
premised upon a determination of what facts are necessary to establish
authority to dispose of the custody question in Missouri. It is submitted
that the underlying philosophy of the Rice decision is that when a child is
found within the physical jurisdiction of Missouri, our courts have a
sufficient interest in the welfare of such child to hear and determine for
themselves questions involving custody, notwithstanding the existence of
a subsisting custody order rendered in another state.
D. The Federal Cases on, Extra-TerritorialRecognition
The dissolution, if not complete negation, of the extra-territorial validity
of custody provisions contained in valid divorce decrees, is reflected in the
trend of decisions in this area handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States. Dismemberment of the marital relationship through meticulous juridical vivisection has produced the concepts of "divisible divorce"
and "separable incidents."'1 22 The court of one state may thus terminate the
marital relationship of the parties although being powerless to adjudicate
121. Operation of the full faith and credit clause in Missouri is fully discussed
in Howey v. Howey, supra note 118. This case and the numerous cases cited and
discussed therein amply demonstrate that where a foreign judgment is attacked

in the forum state on the basis of jurisdictional defect, the forum state looks to
the law of the rendering state to determine whether, under that law, the facts required for authority to adjudicate were present.
122. Proceeding from the decision in Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901),
holding that an ex parte divorce granted by the state of matrimonial domicile must
be given full faith and credit in other jurisdictions, the Court has followed a tortur-

ous path in considering the various aspects of the marital relationship and the
ability of courts to hear and determine the same. In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562 (1906), the Court held that full faith and credit cannot be used to compel a
forum state to recognize as valid a divorce granted ex parte by a domiciliary state

other than that of the matrimonial domicile. Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S.

551 (1913), applying the same jurisdictional rules to dissolution of marriage and
to the adjudication of alimony, held that under full faith and credit the forum
state must recognize a determination denying alimony rendered ex parte by the
state of matrimonial domicile. In Williams v. North Carolina, (I), 317 U.S. 287
(1942), overruling the Haddock case, application of the full faith and credit clause
was extended, requiring the enforcement in the forum state of an ex parte divorce
granted by any sta-te where one spouse was domiciled; this principle was qualified
in Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945), holding that full faith
and credit is required only if the state granting the divorce ex parte was, in fact,
a domiciliary state and that the finding on this issue could not be foreclosed by
the rendering state but could be re-adjudicated later by the forum state. In
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), and Coe v. Coe, 334 U,S. 378 (1948),
holding that where both parties had merely appeared in the original proceeding
in the rendering state the forum state could not relitigate the existence of jurisdic-
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the "separable incidents" of that relationship, such as alimony and support. 1'23 Decisions in this area proceed upon the theory that alimony and

tional facts, the restriction of Williams II upon application of full faith and credit
was weakened. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), applying the rule of
the Skerrer and Coe cases to a collateral attack in the forum state by a third party
who had not appeared in the original proceeding and had an independent interest,
further weakened the impediment upon the operation of full faith and credit posited
by Williams II. Cf. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949). From the rejection of the
Haddock holding in Williams I it would seem to follow that the rule in Thompson,
which was premised upon Haddock, should no longer obtain and. therefore that
the state which was, in fact, the domicile of one spouse could effectually adjudicate
the alimony question ex parte as well as sever the marital relationship. That
such treatment would not be accorded, however, was intimated in Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541 (1948). In the Estin case defendant wife had obtained a separation
and support order in New York. Subsequently, plaintiff husband established
domicile in Nevada where he obtained a divorce ex parte from his wife; the
divorce decree contained an adjudication upon the alimony question holding that
dissolution of the marital relationship ended any extant support order. The
Court held that although the divorce was valid, full faith and credit did not require New York to recognize Nevada's purported termination of the support right.
The Estin decision can be construed not as holding that Nevada could not
adjudicate the support order ex parte, but that the determinative factor precluding
the Nevada court in this respect was the existence of the prior New York order to
which Nevada must give full faith and credit. In Armstrong v. Armstrong,
350 U.S. 568 (1956), the issue of the power of a court to adjudicate support
or alimony ex parte was squarely presented by the rendering state's decree,
based upon constructive service on defendant wife, providing "no award of
alimony to wife, the defendant." The majority skirted the constitutional issue,
holding that the divorce court's decree did not purport to adjudicate the alimony question and that therefore the forum state, in awarding alimony to the
wife, did not fail to give the rendering court's decree full faith and credit. The concurring opinion stated that the divorce court's decree was an alimony judgment
in direct conflict with the rendering court's decree. The concurring opinion held
that the constitutional question of whether the forum state was justified in denying
full faith and credit to the divorce court's decree was presented, and in answer
thereto held that the forum court was justified on the ground that the rendering
court could not adjudicate the alimony question ex parte. The issue touched upon
in Estin and circumvented in Armstrong was determined in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), overruling Thompson and holding, in essence, that any
domiciliary state can grant divorce ex parte but no state, even if domiciliary,
can adjudiciate the alimony question when it grants divorce ex parte. In this
case husband and wife had separated, the wife moving to New York. The husband
obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada, the effect of the decree being to end the
husband's duty of support. Subsequently the wife brought an action in New
York praying for separation and alimony; that court, not having personal jurisdiction over the husband, ordered the sequestration of his property in New York to
satisfy his support obligations, if any, to the wife. The husband appeared. specially
in New York contending that under the full faith and credit clause New York
must recognize the Nevada decree as having ended both the marriage and the
duty to support. The New York court, although recognizing the Nevada decree
as an effective termination of the marital relationship, entered an order directing
the husband to make certain support payments to the wife under a special New
York statute (providing that in actions for divorce, annulment, or separation
where such relief is refused because of a prior ex parte divorce New York may
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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support are personal rights of the absent party; 24 that although a court
can sever the marital relationship ex parte it cannot adjudicate a personal
claim or obligation unless it has personal jurisdiction of the defendant under
the constitutional rule set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff.125 Extension of the
"personal right" theory to the "separable incident" of custody occurs in
May v. Anderson. 26 In this decision, apparently the first case in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has passed upon the full faith and credit
aspects of a decree fixing the custody of minor children in connection with
the divorce of their parents, the Court holds that an enforcing court confronted with the ex parte custody decree of a sister state is not required to
recognize the validity of that decree under the full faith and credit clause.
In arriving at this determination the Court stated,
We find it unnecessary to determine the children's legal domicile
because even if it be with their father, that does not give Wisconsin
[the rendering state], certainly as against Ohio [the enforcing
state], the personal jurisdiction that it must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their immediate possession."2 (Emphasis added.)
The impact of May v. Anderson upon the child custody area is one of
far-reaching consequence not apparent upon a consideration of the decision
alone. The serious threat to the extra-territorial validity of custody awards
occasioned by this decision can only be comprehended by analysis of the
facts of the case and the language of the Court's opinion. In the May case,
plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife were married and domiciled in Wisrender in the same action a judgment for maintenance of the wife). The husband
contended in the Supreme Court that the New York statute, as applied, is unconstitutional because contra the full faith and credit clause. The Supreme Court held
that New York's action was proper and that the Nevada decree, to the extent it
purported to affect the wife's right to support, was void and not entitled to enforcement under full faith and credit. The Court stated that the only difference
between Estin and Vanderbilt is that in the latter situation the wife's personal
right to support was not reduced to judgment prior to the husband's ex parte divorce, whereas in the former it had been. The court held that this difference was
immaterial; that the underlying principle, applicable in both cases, is that the divorce court can not extinguish the support right of the wife unless it has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant wife.
123. Note 122 supra. See, e.g., Beckmann v. Beckmann, supra note 99; Schwer
v. Schwer, 50 S.W.2d 684, 686 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932); Laweing v. Laweing, 21
S.W.2d 2 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Sanders v. Sanders, supra note 101.
124. Estin v. Estin, supra note 122; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948);
Barrett v. Failing, 111 U.S. 523 (1884); Barber v. Barber 62 U.S. (21 How.)
186 (1859).
125. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
126. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
127. Id. at 534.
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sonsin; marital difficulties ensued, and the parties agreed that defendant
should take the children with her to Ohio for a short period. Defendant
decided not to return and within a few days thereafter plaintiff filed suit
in Wisconsin for divorce and custody, serving defendant pursuant to a Wisconsin statute providing for constructive service, on the basis of the children's domicile in Wisconsin. Defendant did not appear or participate in the
Wisconsin proceedings wherein plaintiff was granted a divorce and custody
of the children. Plaintiff then obtained actual custody of the children by
demand upon defendant and returned with them to Wisconsin, where they
remained with him for a period of four years. Plaintiff subsequently brought
the children to Ohio to visit their mother and when he demanded their
return defendant refused to surrender them. Plaintiff filed petition in Ohio
for habeas corpus (under Ohio procedure this writ only tests the immediate
right to possession); the trial and appellate courts transferred custody to
the father, holding that under the full faith and credit, clause the Wisconsin
decree was binding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the full faith
and credit clause did not compel Ohio to enforce the Wisconsin custody
decree rendered without personal jurisdiction over the defendant-mother.
Mr. Justice Burton, writing for the majority, stated the question as follows:
Separated as our issue is from that of the future interests of'
the children, we have before us the elemental question whether a
court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor
present, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having
jurisdiction over her in persotm. Rights far more precious to
appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound
by the Wisconsin award of custody.1 28 (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion notes that the full faith and credit clause does not
entitle a judgment in personam to extra-territorial effect where it is shown
that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought
to be bound thereby. Relying upon its previous decisions in Estin v. Estin; and Kreiger v. Kreiger,130 holding the domiciliary state of one spouse powerless to cut off the other spouse's right to financial support in an ex parte
divorce proceeding severing the marital relationship, the court holds that
a parent's right to the custody of children is a personal right entitled to
at least as much protection as the support right. The Court's decision rests
128. Id. at 533.
129. Supra note 122.
130. Supra note 124.
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squarely upon a determination that the Wisconsin decree, because rendered
without personal jurisdiction of defendant, was not entitled to full faith
and credit; it does not consider the issue of whether the decree, rendered
upon the basis of technical domicile of the child in Wisconsin, violated due
process and was, therefore, invalid even in the rendering state.
Justices Jackson and Reed dissented, stating in their opinion that the
Wisconsin custody award was valid in that it was rendered in the state of

the children's domicile and that a valid judgment is entitled to full faith
and credit. The dissent holds that the only escape from the command of
obedience contained within the full faith and credit clause is a finding that
the initial decree was void because violative of due process and, therefore,
entitled to no standing even in the rendering state. Mr. Justice Minton
dissented on procedural grounds and Mr. Justice Clark did not participate
in the decision. The split among the Justices in deciding this case gives a
predominant importance to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion.,1
Mr. Justice Frankfurter construes the majority's. opinion as holding only
that the full faith and credit clause does not require the forum state, in
disposing of the custody of children in the forum state, to accept the disposition made by another state under the circumstances and that the majority's
opinion does not hold that the forum state would be precluded from recognizing, as a matter of local law, the disposition made by the rendering
state. He states further that the majority's opinion indicates that were the
forum state to enforce the rendering state's custody decree there would be
no offense against due process requirements. Indicating that the question of
extra-territorial validity of custody decrees presents a special problem not
comparable to situations involving the adjudication of property rights, personal claims or marital status, he states:
[the foregoing questions] ... generally give rise to interests different from those relevant to the discharge of a State's continuzing
responsibility to children within her borders ... Legal theories and

their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasons if
uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty toward
children. There are, of course, adjudications other than those pertaining to children, as for instance, decrees of alimony, which may
not be definitive even in the decreeing State, let alone binding under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Interests of a State other than
its duty towards children may also prevail over the interest of national unity that underlies the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But
131. Supra note 126, at 535-36.
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the child's welfare in a custody case has such a claim upon the State
that its responsibility is obviously not to be foreclosed by a prior
adjudication reflecting another State's discharge of its responsibility at another time. 32 (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the later case of Kovacs v. Brewer 33
indicates that it is his position that the full faith and credit clause does
not apply to custody decrees."'
The full import of the decision in May v. Anderson, because of the
grounds upon which the majority's opinion is based and the position of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter as the decisive voter, can only be determined by considering it in connection with the Court's previous decision in New York
132. Supra note 126, at 536.
133. 356 U.S. 604, 609 (1958).
134. In Kovacs the majority opinion circumvented the full faith and credit
issue presented where the enforcing court made a custody disposition contrary
to that adjudicated by the rendering court in determining a motion to modify.
Although the custody question was litigated initially in the rendering court upon
the motion to modify (all parties being personally present there except the child
who was without the state) the Supreme Court held that relitigation of the custody
question culminating in a determination opposite that reached in the rendering
court did not present a constitutional issue due to the probable existence of
"changed circumstances" upon which the second state's decision -may have been
based. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent is premised upon his construction of the
majority opinion as holding that unless an enforcing court finds "changed circumstances" since rendition of the custody decree it must give full faith and credit
to the rendering court's determination, whereas he would hold that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not apply to custody decrees. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
thesis is that both the underlying purpose of full faith and credit and the nature
of custody decrees militate strongly against a constitutionally enforced requirement of respect to foreign custody decrees. He states that it is the purpose of the
full faith and credit doctrine to preclude dissatisfied litigants from taking advantage of the federal character of this country by relitigating in one state issues duly
decided in another state; that the effect of its operation is to give certainty and
finality and an end to harassing litigation. The disposition of child custody, however, presents a different and overriding consideration:
[WJhen courts are confronted with the responsibility of determining the
proper custody of children, a more important consideration asserts itself
to which regard for curbing litigious strife is subordinated-namely, the
welfare of the child. .

.

. When the care and protection of the minors

within their borders falls to States they must be free to do "what is
best for the interest of the child .

. . ."

(Emphasis added.)

356 U.S. at 611-12.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out that the child's welfare is the controlling guide
and that since the passage of time will necessarily work changes in the child's
needs a court in whose jurisdiction the child is found should be free to pass
upon the custody question without being bound by a prior decree of another
court, irrespective of whether a "change in circumstances" is objectively provable.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter does not suggest that the second state should pay no
attention to the prior decree of the rendering state or to the status quo established
thereby; he states that the foregoing are among the relevant and even important
circumstances that the second state should consider when exercising its judgment
on what the welfare of the child before it requires, citing, People ex rel. Allen v.
Allen, 11 N.E. 143 (N.Y. 1887).
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ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey.18 5 In the Halvey case, the husband, wife and
children lived and resided in New York. The wife subsequently took the
children with her to Florida and there obtained an ex parte divorce and
custody award. The defendant-father, having abducted the children from
Florida, returned with them to the State of New York where the plaintiffmother instituted habeas corpus proceedings. The New York court refused
to transfer custody of the children to the mother and the Supreme Court
held that under the full faith and credit clause New York was not required
to do so. The Court circumvented the constitutional issue, holding that the
full faith and credit clause requires an enforcing state to give to a foreign
decree only that force which it has in the rendering state; that the Florida
decision, being subject to modification not only on the basis of changed
circumstances since rendition of the divorce decree but also on the basis
of facts concealed from the rendering court in the original hearing, was,
therefore, res judicata only as to facts before the court at the time of the
judgment. The Court held that what Florida could do in modifying the
custody decree, New York could do, and, therefore, that New York's action
in this regard would not present a question of violation of the full faith and
credit clause.
The Halvey case, although indicating that the full faith and credit
clause requires an enforcing state to recognize the validity of foreign custody
decrees rendered upon a proper jurisdictional base, opened the door to
evasion of full faith and credit in regard to custody decrees. Under that
case, the extra-territorial recognition which custody orders receive or can
command is more theoretical than practical in that an enforcing court,
upon a finding of "changed conditions" can, in effect, adjudicate the custody
question anew.188 Professor Hazard 3 7 points out that under the auspices of
135. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
136. In Kovacs v. Brewer the divorce court had, awarded custody to the
maternal grandfather who subsequently removed the child to his home in another
state. A number of years thereafter the rendering state modified its custody decree, at the motion of the child's mother, awarding custody to the mother. In the
modification proceedings both the grandfather and the child's father presented
affidavits challenging the mother's motion. The mother instituted an action to
secure custody of the child under a special statutory procedure available to either
parent of a child when those parents have been divorced outside the jurisdiction
of North Carolina (where the child resided with the grandfather). After a full
hearing the North Carolina trial court held that the child's welfare demanded she
remain under the grandfather's custody, the court holding that it was not bound
by, or required to give effect to, the modification decree of the rendering state. On
appeal to the supreme court of the rendering state the action of the lower court
was approved; that court stated that the modification order of the rendering state
was not binding because the rendering court had no-jurisdiction to modify after
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/5
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Halvey a parent could be advised to absent himself from the state in which
custody proceedings had been commenced by the other parent, resort to

the child had become a resident and domiciliary of North Carolina. In the proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States the wife contended: (1)
that the rendering court had jurisdiction to modify its decree awarding her
custody; (2) that the jurisdictional question was res judicata in the enforcing
court because the grandfather and father had appeared in the rendering court and
litigated the custody question; and, (3) that the enforcing court had failed to
give the custody decree, as modified, full faith and credit. The Court successfully
avoided any determination upon these questions, holding that the basis of the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision was unclear in that it did not indicate
whether is was premised upon the ground that the modification was not binding
upon the enforcing court because the rendering court had no jurisdiction to modify
custody after the child became a domiciliary of North Carolina, or on the ground
that the enforcing court was not bound by the modification because circumstances
had changed in the interim between rendition of the modification and institution
of the enforcement proceedings and that the enforcing court was therefore free to
determine a different arrangement with regard to custody to suit these changed
conditions. The United States Supreme Court, noting that new evidence had been
offered in the enforcement proceedings, particularly with reference to the period
that had elapsed between modification and the date of the enforcement proceedings,
remanded the case to the North Carolina court for "clarification" of the ground
upon which the decision was premised, stating:
though it is not clear from the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme
Court, it may be, particularly in view of this background [introduction
of new evidence], that it intended to decide the case, at least alternatively, on that basis ["changed conditions"].
Kovacs v. Brewer, supra note 133, at 608. The court, in remanding the case for
clarification, stated further:
[I]f they have not already decided, so they may have an opportunity to
determine the issue of changed circumstances ....

if those courts properly

find that changed conditions make it to the child's best interest for the
grandfather to have custody, decision of the constitutional questions
now before us would be unnecessary. Those questions we explicitly reserve without expressly or impliedly indicating any views about them.

(Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion, in stressing the fact that "some new evidence concerning
environment of the child" was introduced indicates its full adherence to the
doctrine announced in the Halvey case-that the forum state has at least as much
leeway to disregard the custody award, to qualify it, or to depart from it, as does
the state of rendition. The facts of this case, and the language of the majority
opinion, indicate that not only did Halvey open the door to avoidance of extraterritorial recognition but also that the United States Supreme Court intends to
keep that door wide open. In Kovacs only a short time had elapsed between rendition of the modification order and institution of the enforcing action; moreover,
most, if not all, of the evidence presented in the enforcing court had been presented in the modification proceedings by the counter-affidavits filed there by the
father and, grandfather in opposition to the mother's motion. The decision of the
North Carolina Supreme Court, unqualifiedly holding that it was not bound by
the modification order because the rendering court had no jurisdiction to proceed,
clearly presented the full faith and credit question; the opinion of the Supreme
Court, allowing the North Carolina decision to stand only if that court bases its
decision upon a change in conditions, clearly demonstrates that the courts of a
second state when confronted with the subsisting custody award of a sister state
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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self-help, and get the child before a more friendly court, hoping that that
court would either find "changed conditions" or that the facts were not
fully presented at the prior proceeding. With the object of securing custody
awards anew, custody battles took the form of parallel but inconsistent ex
parte proceedings in which the opposite sides of the same question were
presented. But under the Halvey decision if the rendering court had a jurisdictional basis for the disposition of custody, the absent parent ran the risk
that a subsequent jurisdiction would recognize the original award on one of
several grounds: (a) the unclean hands of the abducting parent in defying
the rendering court's decree; (b) the fact that the rendering court proceeded on a jurisdictional basis acknowledged by the enforcing court to be
superior; or, (c) the fact that the rendering court's decision was subject to
modification only upon a demonstration of "changed conditions" and no
such change appeared. Professor Hazard further points out that the decision
in May v. Anderson eliminates the risk imposed in relying on the Halvey
case. Under the majority's opinion in the May case a parent can be advised
to absent himself from any custody proceeding in which his chances of predominating are slight. Under Mr. Justice Frankfurter's theory the parent can
appear in the rendering state, litigate the custody question to decision and if
he loses may then take the child to another state and relitigate the custody
question1 3s Professor Hazard notes that under the present state of the law
May v. Anderson can be used as a double weapon. Thus, if the parent contesting a custody decision was not personally served in the rendering state
may refuse extra-territorial recognition thereto by merely labeling the factors leadmg to this determination as "changed conditions."
That a finding of "changed conditions" is easily made when a court is so inclined and extra-territorial enforcement of custody awards thereby readily averted
cannot be questioned. See Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Bx parte Lofts,
supra note 115; In re Leete, supra note 115; Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77
Ad. 1 (1910). See also, STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICt OF LAWS 328-29 (2d
ed. 1951); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MicH. L.
Rsv. 345 (1953).
137. Hazard, May v. Andersn. Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L.
REv. 379 (1959).
138. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position, in both his concurring opinion in May
v. Anderson and his dissent in Kovacs v. Brewer, is that the minimum connection
that must exist between court and child before the award of custody should carry
any authority is that the court be in a position to inform itself adequately regarding the needs and desires of the child; that the very least that should be expected in order that investigation of the circumstances surrounding the child be
responsible and informative is that the child be physically present within the
jurisdiction and therefore available as a source for arriving at judgment. In positing
"physical presence" of the child as the only basis upon which to adjudicate the
custody question, however, Frankfurter does not indicate that a demonstration that this nexus existed in the rendering court will require a court in another
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he may, relying upon the majority opinion, claim that he is not bound
thereby even though the child was before the rendering court. On the other
hand, if the parent contesting a custody decision was present before the
rendering court he may, relying on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion, claim that the enforcing court should make an individual inquiry
regarding the child's custody. In summarizing the effect of May v. Anderson

state to enforce the foreign court's disposition of custody. On the contrary, it is his
basic premise that any state wherein the child is physically present should be free
to adjudicate the custody question when it is presented to it, notwithstanding
the existence of a subsisting custody determination of another state.
Under this theory, adhered to in many states, e.g., Hopson v. Hopson, 221
F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955); In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Bachman v. Mejias, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 136 N.E.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1956);
People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E.2d 255 (1942); Hicks v.
Bridges, 2 App. Div. 2d 335, 155 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1956), parties to the custody
question may litigate the merits of that question fully without precluding the
courts of another state from hearing and determining the disposition of custody
upon the merits anew, provided the child is within the jurisdiction of the second
state. Although the Missouri decision of In re Rice, notes 113-16 supra and text
supported thereby, states different reasons for its conclusion in this respect, it
cannot be doubted that the basic premise underlying this decision is that the
court in whose jurisdiction the child is present should be free to determine questions affecting its welfare, notwithstanding the existence of the prior determination
of another jurisdiction on this issue.
Unquestionably the criticism leveled against the Supreme Court's decisions in
the Halvey and Kovacs cases is justified when one considers the ease with which
courts have avoided giving recognition to the prior decrees of sister states by finding "changed circumstances" since rendition of the prior decree. It is submitted,
however, that there is quite a difference between a theory permitting the courts of
other states to adjudicate the custody question oppositely to the determination of
another state upon a demonstration of a change of circumstances requiring such
decision since the original rendition, and a theory that each state must be completely unhampered in taking protective action with regard to children within its
territory, notwithstanding the absence of any changed circumstances since rendition of a prior custody award. The latter theory is premised upon the principle
that the state, as parens patriae, may protect any child within its territory irrespective of the domicile or residence of that child. The doctrine of parens patriae
is ordinarily invoked only where the child has been neglected or abandoned; it is a
police measure invoked to protect the child in the assertion of the public interest.
Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 98; Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624
(1925). Where the pareits patriae doctrine is properly invoked, the public,
through some appropriate agency, becomes a party to the proceedings; and the
procedure does not work a change in the parent-child relationship. Daugherty v.
Nelson, supra note 98. Professor Hazard points out, supra note 137, that in divorce
custody proceedings the public interest is asserted by the litigant parenti whose
interests may or may not be the same as the child's; and that in fact whether
those interests are the same or not is the issue. Professor Hazard notes that utilization of the parens patriae doctrine as a basis for intervention in controversies between parents is improper. The limits of the doctrine are suggested by its origin
(protection); it should not be used as a pretense for the adjudication of the status
of parents domiciled elsewhere nor for the definition of parental rights dependent
upon status. See Finlay v. Finlay, supra. See also Foster, For Better or Worse?
Dediions Since Haddock v. Haddock, 47 A.BA.J. 963, 966 (1961).
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upon the child custody area Professor Hazard aptly states: "In sum, under
the majority's rule, parents may ignore the courts; under the rule of concurrence, they may defy them.1 3 9
It would thus appear that the Supreme Court of the United States has
given sanction to the propensity of Missouri courts to ignore the custody
awards of sister states.
III.

ADJUDICATION OF THE CHILD CUSTODY QUESTION
IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS

The writ of habeas corpus is traditionally a writ of right wherein generally the issue involved is whether one is being deprived of his liberty or
unlawfully restrained.140 In modern jurisprudential theory the availability
of habeas corpus has been extended to the determination and disposition
of child custody within the interstices of the divorce statutes and juvenile
court procedures. 141 Utilization of the writ of habeas corpus in the child
custody sphere is not usually directed at freeing the child from illegal
restraint or imprisonment, as is ordinarily the case where the writ is issued,
but at securing an adjudication by the issuing court upon the question of
what will promote the best interest of the child in relation to the disposition
of its custody.
Judicial construction of the habeas corpus provisions of Chapter 532
of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri, has extended to the courts wherein that remedy is available a jurisdiction over the custody question that
is co-ordinate to, and co-extensive with, that possessed by the divorce
court under Chapter 452142 of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri. Al139. Hazard, supra note 137, at 394.
140. Middleton v. Tozer, 259 S.W.2d 80 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Ex parte

De Castro, 238 Mo. App. 1011, 190 S.W.2d 949 (St. L. Ct. App. 1945);
Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, 232 Mo. App. 597, 109
S.W.2d 73 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
141. 1n re Wakefield, 365 Mo. 415, 283 S.W.2d 467 (1955) (en banc); EX
parte Sangster, 295 Mo. 49, 244 S.W. 920 (1922) (en banc); Ex parte Badger, 286
Mo. 139, 226 S.W. 936 (1920) (en banc); In re Scarritt, 76 Mo. 565 (1882); Tripp
v. Brawley, 261 S.W.2d 508 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); State ex rel. White v. Swink, 241
Mo. App. 1048, 256 S.W.2d 825 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953); Ex parte De Castro, supra
note 140; Hamilton v. Henderson, 232 Mo. App. 1234, 117 S.W.2d 379
(K.C. Ct. App. 1938); Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion,
supra note 140; In re Krauthoff, 191 Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112 (K.C. Ct. App.
1915); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913);

In re Steele, 107 Mo. App. 567, 81 S.W. 1182 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904); I1 re Kohl, 82
Mo. App. 442 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900); In re Blackburn, 41 Mo. App. 622 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1890). See also May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, at 532 n.4 (1953).
142. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; Daugherty v. Nelson, 241 Mo. App. 121,
234 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
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though the specific statutory section'"8 of chapter 532 dealing with the
award of child custody would appear to restrict the availability of that
remedy to proceedings instituted between the parents of the child, decisions clearly indicate that the statutory language will not be so limited."
Thus one standing in the position of parent or guardian or one otherwise
entitled to custody by virtue of court order or judgment may, upon ap14 1
plication, secure issuance of the writ.
As will hereafter be shown, under proper circumstances a court in a
habeas corpus proceeding, upon securing jurisdiction over the child and
those having actual custody of the child, may hear evidence upon and
adjudicate the custody question. 1" In such instances the court's power is
of an equitable nature (although habeas corpus is basically and essentially
a legal remedy) and it may, in the exercise of its discretion, award custody
according to the best welfare of the child.1 47 The scope of inquiry regarding
the fitness and competence of those seeking the award of custody is a
broad one, reflecting the equitable character of the court's power in regard
to the disposition of custody. 14
The power of a court with regard to the determination of child custody

143. § 532.370:
Duty of court in awarding custody of children. In all cases where it shall
appear from the evidence in any proceedings in habeas corpus, instituted
between husband and wife for the custody of their children under the
age of forteen years, that by reason of insanity, drunkenness, cruelty, or
other cause, the party against whom the complaint is brought is unfit to
have the care and government of the child or children in controversy, it
shall be lawful for the court hearing said cause to award the custody of
the same to the complainant or other guardian, as shall be deemed best
in the premises, and to make such other orders touching the custody and
control of such child or children as the court may deem proper; and the
order or decree of court touching said custody shall be valid and remain
in force during any period within the minority of said child or children,
which shall be fixed by said court; and any person at any time violating
said order or decree may be dealt with summarily for contempt. (Emphasis
added.)

144. State ex rel. White v. Swink, supra note 141.

145. Ibid.
146. It re Wakefield, supra note 141; Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 142;
Ex parte De Castro, supra note 140.
147. Ex parte Badger, supra note 141; In re Morgan, 117 Mo. 249 (1893) (en
banc); Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 142; Seat v. Seat, 227 S.W.2d 758 (IC.C.
Ct. App. 1950); Lx parte De Castro, supra note 140.
148. In re Richardet, 280 S.W.2d 466 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955); In re Cole, 274
S.W.2d 601 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955); Ex parte Ferone, 267 S.W.2d 695 (K.C. Ct. App.
1954); Ex parte Kaufmann, 262 S.W.2d 56 (K.C. Ct. App. 1953); Cox v. Carapella, 246 S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
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in habeas corpus proceedings may properly be invoked in four situations: 49
(1) where there is no subsisting formal award of custody; (2) where one
formally awarded custody is enforcing that award; (3) where for some
reason a subsisting custody award is illegal or invalid upon the face of
the record; and (4) where the parent who was awarded custody in prior
divorce proceedings has died and the surviving parent is seeking custody
of the child. The nature and extent of the court's power in habeas corpus
over the disposition of child custody is not the same in each of these
situations but will vary in accordance with the manner in which its authority is invoked.
A. Situations Where There Has Been No Prior Custody Award
In habeas corpus proceedings wherein the natural parent is seeking
custody of his children as against respondent parent or third parties respondent, there having been no prior formal custody award to either, the
court will hear evidence upon and determine the custody issue, the question of either party's legal right to custody being measured solely in terms
of the child's welfare. In this instance the respondent may, by way of return to the writ, raise the issue of the petitioner's fitness to secure custody
of the child, and the court will proceed to a determination of custody based
upon a full inquiry into the fitness and suitability of the parties contestant.'"
The petitioner's fitness, when challenged in this manner, is measured by
the same standards appertaining in determining whether a parent has forfeited the right to continued custody of the child under those provisions of
the Juvenile Court Act which relate to the court's power to remove custody
of a child from its parents."9 ' The broad extent of the scope of inquiry in this
regard is demonstrated in In re Richardet, 52 wherein the court stated:
In a habeas corpus proceeding between a natural parent
seeking to obtain custody . . . and persons who hold the child
.149. In re Wakefield, supra note 141.
150. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; In re Richardet, supra note 148; State
ex rel. White v. Swink, supra note 141; Ex parte Kaufman, supra note 148; Cox v.
Carapella, supra note 148; Williams v. Williams, 205 S.W.2d 949 (K.C. Ct. App.
1947); Ex parte De Castro, supra note 140; McDevitt v. Morrison, 180 S.W.2d
608 (Spr. Ct. App. 1944).
151. Ex parte Badger, supra note 141; In re Richardet, supra note 148; Ex
parte Ferone, supra note 148; Ex parte Kaufman, supra note 148; State ex rel.
White v. Swink, supra note 141; Cox v. Carapella, supra note 148; Ex parte De
Castro, supra note 140. See also Badger v. Badger, 204 Mo. App. 252, 224 S.W. 41
(K.C. Ct. App. 1920) (equity court has jurisdiction without aid of statute to deprive parent of custody if it finds, as a matter of fact, that the parent is an unfit
person).
152. 280 S.W.2d 466 (St. L. Ct. App. 1955).
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without the sanction of any judicial decree, the fitness, competence
and suitability of the parent to take chayge of the child, when
challenged, depends upon whether petitioner is guilty of wilful
abandonment and wilful neglect to provide the child with proper
care and maintenance; whether the child, if placed in the custody
of the natural parent, would become homeless, or dependent upon
the public for support or reduced to a state of habitual vagrancy
or mendacity, or ill-treated or that his life, health, or morals
would be endangered by continued cruel treatment, neglect, immorality, gross misconduct or depravity upon the part of the
petitioner. 53 (Emphasis added.)
B. Situations Where One Having Legal Custody Seeks To Enforce His
RigLts Where Suck Rights Are Challenged
Subject to the above indicated propensity of Missouri courts, in habeas
corpus proceedings, to disregard the existence of a foreign custody award
or foreign divorce proceeding when the child affected thereby is physically
present in Missouri, it has generally been held that the writ of habeas
corpus cannot be used to interfere with the inherent right and jurisdiction of the divorce court to determine and award custody. 54 Where a
divorce court, having proper jurisdiction, has exercised that jurisdiction
by making a custody award of record, that court retains jurisdiction over
the custody question, precluding adjudication thereon by another court
under authority of the habeas corpus statute. 5 5 The prior exercise by
the divorce court of its power to dispose of custody proscribes the court
in habeas corpus, a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, from making an
independent determination of the disposition of custody.5 6 Thus the
existence of a prior custody award narrows the permissible scope of in-

153. Id. at 471.
154. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, 357 Mo.
134, 206 S.W.2d 558 (1947); Ex parte Sangster, supra note 141; In re Morgan,
supra note 147; Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, 170 S.W.2d 697 (St. L. Ct.
App, 1943); Hamilton v. Henderson, supra note 141; In re Krauthoff, supra note
141.
155. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra
note 154; Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 992, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932) (en banc); State
ex rel. Dew v. Trimble, 306 Mo. 657, 269 S.W. 617 (1925); Robinson v. Robinson,
268 Mo. 703, 186 S.W. 1032 (1916); Shreckengaust v. Shreckengaust, 219 S.W.2d
244 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949); Fernbaugh v. Clark, 236 Mo. App. 1200, 163 S.W.2d
999 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927);
Cole v. Cole, 89 Mo. App. 228 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
156. State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra note 154; Ex parte Sangster, supra
note 141; Ex parte Lofts, 222 S.W.2d 101 (Spr. Ct. App. 1949); In re Krauthoff,
supra note 141.
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quiry in habeas corpus proceedings to a determination of whether that
award legally justifies the party holding custody'57 or seeking custody 58
thereunder to possession of the child. As indicated above, the divorce court,
having awarded custody of the child, retains jurisdiction over the issue
of the fitness or suitability of the parties contestant, and, therefore, this
issue cannot be raised or determined in the habeas corpus proceeding "
The jurisdiction of the divorce court with respect to the issue of
custody attaches at the time of the filing of the divorce petition. Thus the
mere pendency of a divorce action prohibits the determination of the disposition of custody in habeas corpus proceedings even prior to the divorce
court's determination of this issue, and, if this issue is raised in a separate
habeas corpus proceeding, the matter will be remitted to the divorce court
wherein proceedings are pending.1 60
An apparent exception to this general rule is indicated in the early
case of In re Delano. 6 In that case, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, al157. State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra note 154 (respondent wife awarded
custody in divorce proceedings); Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 142 (respondent
aunt awarded custody in divorce proceedings); Shreckengaust v. Shreckengaust,
supra note 155 (respondent husband awarded custody in Nevada divorce proceeings); Bell v. Catholic Charities of St. Louis, supra note 154 (habeas corpus
proceeding instituted by mother of child against respondent institution awarded
custody of child in divorce proceedings); Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 155
(respondent father awarded custody on motion to modify); Tomlinson v. French
Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, supra note 140 (respondent institution holding
custody under divorce court's order).
158. In re Wakefield, supra note 141 (petitioner husband awarded custody in
divorce proceeding); Ex parte Lofts, supra note 156 (petitioner wife awarded custody by interlocutory decree in California divorce proceeding).
159. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 545, 252
S.W.2d 323 (1952); State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra note 154; Tripp v.
Brawley, 261 S.W.2d 508 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953); Ex parte Lofts, supra note 156;
State ex rel. Gray v. Hennings, 194 Mo. App. 545, 185 S.W. 1153 (St L. Ct. App.
1916); Libbe v. Libbe, 157 Mo. App. 610, 138 S.W. 685 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911);
In re Kohl, supra note 141; In re Delano, 37 Mo. App. 185 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889).
Cf. Ferguson v. Garrison, 262 S.W.2d 163 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953), wherein
petitioner mother, who had been awarded custody in divorce suit, brought habeas
corpus to obtain custody from the child's uncle. Respondent uncle in his return
alleged the unfitness and previous and present inability of petitioner to care for the
child. The court heard evidence on this issue and determined that the child's
welfare required that she be remanded to the uncle's custody. The Missouri Supreme
Court, in In. re Wakefield, overruled the holding in the Ferguson case, stating that
insofar as the court there adjudicated and awarded custody in the face of, and
contrary to, the divorce court award, that decision is in error.
160. Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 159; State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra
note 154; Ex parte Sangster, supra note 141; In re Morgan, supra note 147;
rn re Scarritt, supra note 141; Tripp v. Brawley, supra note 159; In re Krauthoff,
supra note 141; Ex parte Ingenbohs, 173 Mo. App. 261, 158 S.W. 878 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1913); In re Blackburn, 41 Mo. App. 622 (K.C. Ct. App. 1890).
161. 37 Mo. App. 185 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889).
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though following the general rule and refusing to determine the custody
question, posed a hypothetical situation wherein habeas corpus might properly be utilized to determine custody notwithstanding the pendency of a
divorce action. The court there indicated that where an emergency exists
and a change in custody is necessary to protect the child's health or morals
a court may intervene by habeas corpus notwithstanding the fact that
the custody question is pending adjudication in a divorce suit.162 Thus, the
availability of the habeas corpus procedure in this type of situation has ap113
parently not been entirely foreclosed in Missouri.
Habeas corpus may, however, be availed of to secure the adjudication
of the custody question notwithstanding the existence of a subsisting custody award by a divorce court or a juvenile court, where it can be shown
that the court awarding custody did not have a proper jurisdictional base
upon which to predicate its decision. "" Upon such a showing, the scope of
inquiry in the habeas corpus proceeding is the same as that obtaining where
there has been no formal custody award.1 65
Similarly, although the court awarding custody may have the necessary jurisdictional basis upon which to premise a custody award, the legality of the award may still be challenged in habeas corpus on non-jurisdictional grounds.168 Any such challenge, however, must be based upon a
defect apparent on the record. 8 7 If such defect is found and the award is
held to be illegal, the court will not decide the custody question on its
162. Id. at 187.
163. Libbe v. Libbe, supra note 159; In re Kohl, supra note 159.
See State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra note 154, at 143, 206 S.W.2d at 563,
where the court, after discussing the exception to the general rule posited in In re
Delano stated: "[The husband's] petition for habeas corpus below made no
contention whatever that any emergency existed, or that the health or morals of
the minor child ... were endangered." See also 39 C.J. Habeas Corpus § 41a, citing
In re Delano as an exception to the operation of the general rule.
That this problem may be obviated appears probable in view of the provisions
of the Juvenile Code authorizing the immediate assumption of a child's custody by
the juvenile court where it appears that the child's welfare requires such action.
See note 15 supra and text supported thereby.
164. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; It re Rice, 316 S.W.2d 329 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1958); Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 142.
165. Ibid.
166. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; Fernbaugh v. Clark, supra note 155;
Tomlinson v. French Institute of Notre Dame de Sion, supra note 140; State
ex rel. Dew v. Trimble, supra note 155 (legality of award of custody to
respondent father by juvenile court could be collaterally attacked in habeas corpus
proceeding by petitioner-mother alleging that juvenile court had not determined
that child was "neglected" and "abandoned" within the terms of the juvenile
court statute).
167. Ibid.
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merits, with the result that the only consequence of the court's action is,
in effect, to void the disposition of custody as awarded by the rendering
court. In Fernbaug. v. Clarkt18 petitioner-mother instituted habeas corpus
proceedings against respondent-father who had custody of the children
under a modification order entered by the divorce court. In the proceedings petitioner attacked the legality of the order, demonstrating that it had
been entered without precedent legal notice to her of pendency of the
motion to modify. Custody of the children was remanded to the mother,
the court holding that rendition of the modification without legal notice
to the mother, who had been awarded custody in the original proceedings,
violated due process and therefore did not justify respondent's retention
of custody thereunder. Tonlinson v. French Institu~te of Notre Dame de
Sion,19 involved a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by the mother of
a child against the respondent institution to which custody of the child
had been awarded in a prior divorce action. The court, in considering the
legality of the custody award, noted that the record of the rendering court
showed on its face that neither parent had been found an unfit custodian
and moreover that the tenor of the decision demonstrated that the divorce
court considered both parents fit. The court held that the divorce court's
decree, awarding custody of a two year old child to an institution in the
face of findings indicating neither parent unfit for the award of custody, was
violative of due process and in excess of the divorce court's authority. In
stating the general rule that a court may not interfere with the exercise
of the divorce court's continuing jurisdiction over the disposition of custody,
the court stressed the proposition that before a court can lawfudly take the
custody of children from parents and place custody in a third party or institution there must be evidence and findings of fact that said parents are
unfit. Although the writ of habeas corpus cannot usurp the functions of
a writ of error or appeal and disturb any finding of fact made by the
divorce court, the court notes that the writ does partake of the nature of
a writ of error, "in so far as it brings into review the legality of the
authority by which the circuit court acts in making the award."'170 (Emphasis added.) The court further observed:

168. 236 Mo. App. 1200, 163 S.W.2d 999 (K.C. Ct. App. 1942).
169. 232 Mo. App. 597, 109 S.W.2d 73 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
170. Id. at 603, 109 S.W.2d at 77.
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Our conclusion reached in this case is based upon the fact that in
the exercise of jurisdiction it is not sufficient that the act be in the
name of the law, but that the act must be done by virtue of the
authority of law and the result reached must be by due process of
law.17 1 (Emphasis added.)
C. Surviving Spouse's Rights in Habeas Corpus
Of course, where one of the parties to the original divorce action dies,
the divorce proceeding terminates and the continuing jurisdiction of the
rendering court over the custody question abates.1?2 Thus, if the parent
awarded custody in the divorce action has died, the right of the surviving
parent to custody of the child cannot be asserted in the rendering court
through a modification of the divorce decree 17 Abatement of the divorce
action permits another court, under authority of the habeas corpus provisions, to exercise its co-ordinate jurisdiction at the instance of the surviving parent over the custody question and to adjudicate the disposition
of custody on the merits as between the surviving parent and third parties
after full inquiry regarding the suitability and fitness of the parties17
contestant.
CONCLUSIONS

In considering the interrelation of the powers of courts to adjudicate
the disposition of custody under the divorce and habeas corpus statutes, it
is apparent from the foregoing that interested third parties have no remedy
through these procedures to initiate a change of custody of a child although
a change might clearly be justified. For example, it is well established in
Missouri that third parties may not intervene in divorce proceedings in
order to secure an award of custody or to obtain modification of an existing custody award. 17 5 In addition, although the habeas corpus remedy may
be instituted to challenge the legality or validity of a custody award, third
171. Id. at 604, 109 S.W.2d at 78.
172. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d
841 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949); State ex rel. Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo. App. 389, 205
S.W.2d 749 (K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
173. Schumacher v. Schumacher, supra note 172. Cf. Edwards v. Engledorf, 180
S.W.2d 603 (Spr. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that where mother, who was awarded
custody in divorce proceedings, had died, father's remedy to secure custody from
grandparents was by application to divorce court and not by habeas corpus).
174. In re Scarritt, supra note 141; State ex rel. Walker v. Crouse, supra note
172; Ex parte Ingenbohs, supra note 160; In re Steele, supra note 141; In re Blackburn, supra note 141.
175. See note 116 supra and text supported thereby.
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parties not standing in the position of parent or guardian to the child are
precluded from instituting habeas corpus proceedings.17 6 Thus, assuming
there has been a custody award to one parent and that parent subsequently
becomes unfit and unsuitable for the retention of custody, and assuming
that the other parent is either absent from the state or takes no interest
in the child, the question arises as to whether third persons are foreclosed
from any avenue for challenge to, or modification of, the custody award.
That third parties are not so foreclosed in Missouri, however, is demonstrated by decisions holding that although the assumption of power to
dispose of the custody question by the divorce court will preclude courts
of co-ordinate jurisdiction from considering that question, the divorce court's
power to dispose of custody is not exclusive. The decision of the Supreme
Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Dew v. Trimble 77 holds that the procedures available under the Juvenile Court Act could have been invoked
in proper circumstances notwithstanding the exercise of the divorce court's
power over the custody question and that the continuing jurisdiction of the
divorce court over the custody problem did not preclude the juvenile court
from proceeding in a case properly falling within its statutory jurisdiction.
In this case, the mother of the child had been granted a divorce and
custody. Subsequently, the father filed a petition in the juvenile court
charging that these children were "neglected" within the meaning of the
juvenile statute. A trial in the juvenile court resulted in a determination
that the children were neglected within the meaning of the statute, and
the court ordered that the children be made its wards, committing their
custody to the father. The wife filed a habeas corpus proceeding against the
father and the judge of the juvenile court, contending that the divorce
decree gave her custody and that the divorce court alone had jurisdiction
over this question, proscribing any interference by another court. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court was not proscribed
from taking jurisdiction over the custody question upon the petition filed by
the father although he had been the losing party in the divorce proceeding.
That court premised its decision upon the ground that the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court is paramount to and not concurrent with the incidental
jurisdiction which a divorce court may have over custody in the premises.

176. State ex rel. White v. Swink, supra note 141 (one having no legal right
to custody cannot institute habeas corpus proceedings seeking to obtain custody).
See also note 145 supra and text supported thereby.
177. 269 S.W. 617 (1925).
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The Missouri Supreme Court specifically affirmed the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals upon this point (although reversing on other
grounds),71 indicating that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is paramount to the "continuing" jurisdiction of the court rendering a divorce
decree. In so holding, the supreme court stated:
The holding of the Court of Appeals is, in effect, that by the
Juvenile Court Act the State has elected to exert its power, parens
patriae, with respect to children which fall within the statutory
definitions of "neglected" and "delinquents"; that it has invested
the juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction to determine and provide the care and custody of such children; and that, when the
juvenile court has in a given case assumed jurisdiction with regard
to any such child, its jurisdiction supersedes that of any and all
other courts touching the same subject-matter. This ruling does not
conflict with ... any other decision of this court. We have never
had occasion to pass upon the question. We observe, however, that
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals is in accord with that
reached by eminent courts of other jurisdictions, as its citations
show.'
Although the supreme court's decision in the Dew case might appear
questionable as precedent for the proposition that the juvenile court may
dispose of the custody question notwithstanding the exercise of the power
to determine that question, or the assumption of that power, by a court
under the divorce statutes, later decisions in Missouri indicate adherence
to the doctrine that the juvenile court's jurisdiction is a supervening one. 8s
There are no decisions in Missouri other than the Dew case (either under
178. In the Dew case the mother instituted habeas corpus proceedings against
respondent father contending that the juvenile court, in assuming jurisdiction over,
and awarding the custody of, the child, had not determined that the child came
within the statutory terms of the juvenile court statute. The Kansas City Court of
Appeals held: (1) that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is paramount to and
not concurrent with that of the divorce court in the child custody area; and, (2)
that the judgment of the juvenile court was valid as against collateral attack in
the habeas corpus proceedings. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals
on the first point but held that since the record of the juvenile court contained no
finding that the child was "neglected" within the meaning of the juvenile court
statute its custody award was void and subject to collateral attack by writ of
habeas corpus. The court stated that so much of the court of appeals decision
as holds contra (on the collateral attack point) is therefore quashed.
179. State ex rel. Dew v. Trimble, 306 Mo. 657, 671-72, 269 S.W. 617, 621
(1925) (en banc).
180. In re Wakefield, supra note 141; Hayes v. Hayes, supra note 159; State
exrd. Burtrum v. Smith, supra note 154; Hupp v. Hupp, 238 Mo. App. 964, 194
S.W.2d 215 (Spr. Ct. App. 1946).
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the present Juvenile Code or prior Juvenile Court Acts) turning upon the
assertion of the juvenile court's power in supersedence to the "continuing"
jurisdiction of the divorce court; however, the language of decisions in the
child custody areae81 wherein this issue has been discussed make it clear
that when the question is presented it will be determined that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is paramount to and supersedes the jurisdiction
of the divorce court over the custody question and that where its jurisdiction
is properly invoked, the juvenile court may make its determination regarding the disposition of custody in the same manner as if no other decree or
award regarding custody existed.
Aside from the fact that the Missouri cases, and, in particular, the
Dew case, clearly indicate that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court acting
pursuant to authority of the Juvenile Code is paramount to and supersedes the jurisdiction of the divorce court or a court in which habeas corpus
proceedings have been brought which may have awarded custody of a
child, it is clear that such a result is the only one which can be reached.
Such a result should not be considered, and is not, a deprivation of the
co-ordinate jurisdiction of the divorce court or the court in which habeas
corpus has been filed as to custody matters properly before such courts. On
the contrary, the Juvenile Code establishes unique and separate jurisdictional conditions for the assertion of power by a juvenile court in child
custody matters which have no direct relation to the jurisdictional conditions which give rise to the powers of a divorce court or a court entertaining the writ of habeas corpus. Certainly, the purpose and intent of
the Juvenile Code is to establish paramount jurisdiction in cases properly
presented to that court. In this connection, it is significant to observe
that the facilities for investigation and for care and treatment of children
afforded by the Juvenile Code to the juvenile court which are not afforded
to any other courts indicate that the juvenile courts are intended to be,

181. In re Wakefield, supra note 141 (noting that under certain circumstances
parties may have recourse to proceedings under the juvenile court statute); Hayes
v. Hayes, supra note 159 ("this jurisdiction . . . [of the divorce court] is
exclusive except as it may be affected or superseded by the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court under certain circumstances"); State ex rel. Burtrum v. Smith, supra
note 154, at 141, 206 S.W.2d at 562 ("Our decisions hold that when such an issue
[custody] is involved in a divorce case in a given court, that court has and retains
exclusive jurisdiction [save in juvenile court cases], although a different court
otherwise could adjudicate the same issue by habeas corpus. .. ."); Hupp v. Hupp,
.nspra note 180 (the grandparents' relief is by proceeding under the juvenile statute
and not by motion to modify in the divorce proceeding).
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and are in fact, more qualified to assume paramount jurisdiction over all
matters, including custody matters, properly presented to them. Indeed,
recognizing the qualifications of the juvenile court in the premises, Section
211.051 of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri, while not depriving other
courts of the power to determine legal custody of children in proper cases,
affords them the privilege of certifying custody matters to the juvenile
court for hearing, determination or recommendation. That section provides:
Nothing contained in . . . [the Juvenile Code] deprives other
courts of the right to determine legal custody of children .... Such
questions, however, may be certified by another court to the
juvenile court for hearing, determination or recommendation.
(Emphasis added.)
In limiting the above discussion to custody awards under the Juvenile
Code, the divorce law, and the habeas corpus statute, the authors have
not lost sight of the provisions of Chapter 475 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri, which provide for the appointment by the probate court of
guardians of the person or estate, or both, of minor children, nor is such
limitation intended in any way to minimize the legal or social importance
or significance of guardianships of the person of a minor. The peculiar competency of the guardianship law, however, is in the area of the protection
of a child's property and contract rights, as compared to his person, and
most of the provisions of the guardianship law, as well as most of the cases
decided thereunder, relate to the guardian's position as custodian of a
minor's estate, which is not included in the subject matter of this article.
It should be pointed out, however, that, in recognition of the status
and stature of a guardian, the Juvenile Code explicitly requires that the
guardian of a child, if any, must be notified whenever a petition with respect to the child has been filed with the juvenile court, 8 2 that the guardian
shall be notified whenever a child is taken into custody,183 and, generally
that the guardian be afforded all the rights of a parent of the child. Although the affirmative legal responsibilities of a guardian to the care of
the person of his ward are not entirely clear, the Juvenile Code affords a
guardian full opportunity to assert such responsibilities as may be occasioned
by any proceeding in the juvenile court.
Conflicts, of course, can arise (and have arisen) as to the jurisdiction
of a probate court which has appointed a guardian of a child, as compared
182. § 211.101.
183. § 211.131.
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to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court or a divorce court where a child's
custody is at issue. From the few cases which have been decided on this
question, however, it would appear that the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court or the divorce court, if properly asserted, is paramount to the jurisdiction of the probate court. In the recent case of State v. Carroll'8 4 the
maternal grandparents of a child whose parents were both deceased filed
a petition for transfer of custody in the juvenile court preliminary to the
filing of a petition for adoption. The paternal grandmother of the child,
who was the duly appointed guardian of the person of the child, filed a writ
of prohibition against the juvenile court seeking to prevent that court
from hearing the case on the grounds that the transfer of custody petition
was a collateral attack on the judgment of the probate court which had
appointed the guardian and that, accordingly, the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction. The court held that the juvenile court had jurisdiction and
that this issue had been resolved by the Missouri Supreme Court in
In re Dure, 185 wherein the Missouri Supreme Court held that an adoption
proceeding brought before the juvenile court under circumstances not
unsimilar to those in the Carroll case was not an attack on the status
of the guardian. The court in Duren stated that the effect of the adoption
proceeding on the guardian is only incidental and consequential and that,
although the adoption proceeding might call for termination of the guardianship and a final settlement of the estate, it would not make the guardian's
appointment void ab initio.

184. 343 S.W.2d 622 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
185. 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947) (en banc).
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